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Towards a Feminist Jurisprudence
ANN C. SCALES*
Although the conjunction of the terms "feminist" and "jurispru-
dence"' might be said to indicate the dogma resulting from the common
orientation of a political interest group, the purpose of this article is not
to postulate a theory of law which is inherently self-interested. Instead,
this article demonstrates the necessity of making a feminist evaluation
of our jurisprudence and of taking a jurisprudential view of feminism.2
* B.A. 1974, Wellesley College; J.D. 1978, Harvard University. Assistant Professor,
University of New Mexico School of Law. For inspiration and editorial assistance, I would
like to thank Suzanne Stocking, Nancy Weston, Lynne Adrian, Professor Leo Kanowitz,
Clara Oleson, Diane Daley, Jed Dube and Leslie Klein. This article could not have been
completed without the research assistance of Peter Cubra. Special thanks to Dean Robert
Desiderio, Adele Hunter and Diane Byrne, without whom a manuscript would not have
materialized.
The conjunction of the terms "feminist" and "jurisprudence" may make the reader
justly nervous. After all, "feminism," ignoring for the moment the fact that there is no
agreement as'to what values and goals inform the concept, might be said to boil down to the
common orientation of a political interest group. And "jurisprudence" is the theory of law
in the broadest sense, such that the concerns -of women constitute only a small part of its
coverage. Therefore, to speak of a feminist jurisprudence is to postulate a dogma which is
inherently self-interested. One might just as well suggest a "black," "Chicano," "garment
workers" or "gay" jurisprudence which would reflect its own concerns at the expense of
neutrality, generality and principle.
' In April of 1978, the women of Harvard Law School conducted a conference entitled
"Celebration 25: A Generation of Women at Harvard Law School" in Cambridge,
Massachusetts, to commemorate the silver anniversary of Harvard's first class to include
women.
More than a year before, it was decided by the planning committee that one of the five
panel discussions to be offered during the April weekend should be intentionally esoteric. It
should offer to alumnae returning from the working world a synthetic, perhaps even in-
spirational experience. Hence, Towards a Feminist Jurisprudence was born, the original
description of which read: "Reasonable women will differ on whether there is or should be
such a thing. A wildly philosophical exploration of the impact of feminism on the structures
and principles that support the legal system." Though the astute panelists concluded that
there is not, and perhaps should not be, such a thing as a "feminist jurisprudence," the title
has been retained, due in part to the admiration, affection and historically threatening at-
titude generated by this panel and by the entire weekend.
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The need for a feminist jurisprudence is focused most sharply by the
issue of pregnancy. In the words of one commentator, pregnancy is "the
final and decisive battleground"' in the struggle for the just treatment
of both sexes. The response of the law to the issue of childbearing
marks a pivotal point in the history of the emergence of women as first
class citizens. This article postulates that the modes of response
presently available are inadequate to this historical challenge, that an
inquiry into the substructures of the legal order is required and that
nothing less will do, if the law is to be reconciled to the experience of
women everywhere.
First, this article analyzes the three cases4 in which the Supreme
Court declined to extend disability or sick leave benefits5 to pregnant
workers. Those cases isolate pregnancy as the ultimate obstacle to
judicial protection of the rights of women. The Supreme Court's at-
titude towards pregnancy as manifested in mandatory pregnancy leave
cases and equal protection clause6 cases which are not related to
pregnancy is explored to determine whether these developments signal
any changing values among the Justices that could bring about a more
just treatment of pregnancy. The article concludes that the present
Court has taken an apparently inexorable position at a polar extreme
when it addresses the place of women in society.
Second, the article describes the congressional reaction to General
Electric Co. v. Gilbert-a clash between the judicial and legislative
branches which culminated in an amendment to Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,' forbidding discrimination on the basis of pregnancy.
The article argues that, although the 95th Congress displayed a far
more sophisticated and compassionate view of pregnancy than did the
majority of the Supreme Court, the Congress, too, fundamentally failed
The panelists were the Honorable Shirley S. Abrahamson, Justice, Wisconsin Supreme
Court; Brenda Feigen Fasteau, Attorney, New York City, former Director, ACLU Women's
Rights Project; Stewart B. Oneglia, Director, Task Force on Sex Discrimination, Depart-
ment of Justice; and Wendy Webster Williams, Assistant Professor of Law, Georgetown
University Law Center. The author "moderated" the discussion.
' Legislation to Prohibit Sex Discrimination on the Basis of Pregnancy: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Employment Opportunities of the House Comm. on Education
and Labor, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1977) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings] (statement
of Wendy W. Williams).
' Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977); General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429
U.S. 125 (1976); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
' It should be noted that throughout this article, the term "benefits," unless otherwise
noted, is used to refer collectively to any disability, sick leave or medical benefits available
or not available through employment.
8 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
429 U.S. 125 (1976).




to grapple with the underlying dilemma. In this context, the probable
and possible limitations in the coverage of the amendment are con-
sidered.
Next, the article examines the probable impact, or lack of impact, the
proposed Equal Rights Amendment9 would have on the pregnancy bene-
fits dilemma. The article argues that either because there is something
inherent in the proposed amendment which restricts its coverage or
because the amendment will only be given as broad an interpretation as
the Supreme Court, which is already empowered to protect women's
rights under the fourteenth amendment, chooses to give it, the amend-
ment cannot be relied on to meet the real challenge raised by the issues
of pregnancy and childrearing.
Finally, this article describes the theories of some radical and not-so-
radical feminists in order to illuminate the substantive, historical issue
of childbearing. This section suggests that, since the Supreme Court and
the Congress have not demonstrated an effective vision of justice for
women, some other vision of equality must be incorporated into the
litigation and decisionmaking process. It is argued that a legislative and
judicial policy should be developed which would account fully, economi-
cally as well as legally, for the sex-unique aspects of procreation, namely
childbearing and breastfeeding. Such an incorporation of women's
capabilities into the legal and social mainstream need not be understood
as a special favor to women; nor would it degrade women in the way
that many egalitarian schemes would do.
THE SUPREME COURT AND PREGNANCY
In the last decade, the Supreme Court has on three occasions con-
sidered the question of whether either the equal protection clause or
Title VII prohibits the exclusion of pregnancy-related disabilities from
disability insurance or sick leave coverage.'" Although it is necessary to
describe these cases briefly, this article is not intended to be a fully
developed criticism of them. Rather, the cases are here presented in
order to illustrate a particular judicial attitude towards women in their
procreative capacities, and to explore whether, and in what circum-
stances, the outcomes of these cases would have been different.
U.S. CONST. amend XXVII (proposed), H.R.J. Res. 208, 118 CONG. REC. 9544 (1972).
,' The issue of the availability of benefits to pregnant workers was one of three related
issues that emerged in the Supreme Court in the 1970's. The other two were mandatory
maternity leave and the denial of accumulated seniority upon a worker's return from a
pregnancy-related absence. Although the latter two issues are touched on in this article,
the focus is on the benefits that would impose an immediate cost upon the employer or in-




The Pregnancy-Related Disability Cases
In Aiello v. Hansen," the plaintiffs sought to enjoin the enforcement
of California's state-administered disability insurance plan which ex-
cluded from its coverage the payment of insurance benefits for wage
loss resulting from the disability accompanying normal pregnancy and
childbirth." The plan, which was funded entirely by contributions from
participating employees,1 3 also excluded coverage of individuals under
court commitment for dipsomania, drug addiction or sexual psychopa-
thy. 4 It included heart attacks, cosmetic surgery, sterilization, pro-
statectomies, circumcision, hemophilia, gout, sickle-cell anemia,
cataracts and wisdom tooth removal. 5 The plaintiffs claimed that the
plan denied equal protection of the laws to pregnant women, and the
district court began its analysis with the assumption that alleged dis-
crimination on the basis of a sex-linked characteristic is the equivalent
of discrimination on the basis of sex. 6 Using the "slightly altered"'7 ra-
tional basis test required by Reed v. Reed,8 the three-judge district
court formulated the issue: "The question whether the exclusion of
pregnancy-related disabilities from the program is arbitrary or rational
depends upon whether pregnancy and pregnancy-related illness sub-
stantially differ from the included disabilities in some manner relevant
to the purposes of the disability insurance program."' 9 The court held
the exclusion unconstitutional because, although pregnancy disabilities
differ from other disabilities, such differences were not found to be ra-
tionally related either to the express purpose ° of the California disability
" 359 F. Supp. 792 (N.D. Cal. 1973), rev'd sub nom., Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484
(1974).
" CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 2626 (West 1972).
"Disability" or "disabled" includes both mental or physical illness and mental
or physical injury. An individual shall be deemed disabled in any day in which,
because of his physical or mental condition, he is unable to perform his regular
... work. In no case shall the term "disability" or "disabled" include any injury
or illness caused by or arising in connection with pregnancy up to the termina-
tion of such pregnancy and for a period of 28 days thereafter.Id.
3 359 F. Supp. at 794.
" CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 2678 (West 1972).
Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 499-501 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting), rev'g Aiello v.
Hansen, 359 F. Supp. 792 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
" See 359 F. Supp. at 795-96.
" Id at 797.
404 U.S. 71 (1971).
" 359 F. Supp. at 797.
'1 The statute recites that its purpose is "to compensate in part for the wage loss sus-
tained by individuals unemployed because of sickness or injury and to reduce to a minimum
the suffering caused by unemployment resulting therefrom." CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 2601
(West 1972). The lower court found that the articulated purpose was not served by the ex-
clusion of pregnancy since "the economic hardship pregnant women suffer when they can-
not work is identical to the hardship of other disabled workers." 359 F. Supp. at 797.
[Vol. 56:375
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insurance program or to the "unexpressed purposes"'" behind the exclu-
sion of pregnancy from the coverage of that program.
Although the case was presented and decided in the trial court as a
sex discrimination case, the Supreme Court, in Geduldig v. Aiello,'
framed the issue in a dramatically different way. Referring to those
choices made by the California legislature which, the state asserted, ex-
plained the solvency of the program, it stated: "The essential issue in
this case is whether the Equal Protection Clause requires such policies
to be sacrificed or compromised in order to finance the payment of
benefits to those whose disability is attributable to normal pregnancy
and delivery."' Thus, the Supreme Court construed the challenge fun-
damentally to be that the statutory scheme was underinclusive in insur-
ing some risks and not others.
The Court found that California had three legitimate interests at
stake: maintaining the self-supporting nature of the program, distribu-
ting resources so as to cover included disabilities adequately as opposed
to covering all disabilities inadequately and maintaining the employee
contribution rate at a low level for the benefit of "particularly low-
income employees who may be most in need to the disability insur-
ance." It also stated: "There is nothing in the Constitution ... that re-
quires the State to subordinate or compromise its legitimate interests
solely to create a more comprehensive social insurance program than it
already has."" Moreover, it was found that these objectives were
achieved by a permissible means. Speaking in terms of the actuarial
benefits of the entire insurance program, the Court touched on the sex
discrimination claim, continuing: "There is no risk from which men are
protected and women are not. Likewise, there is no risk from which
21 Counsel for the state asserted four additional purposes which were not articulated by
the California legislature. Counsel asserted, first, that the exclusion was necessary to
preserve the solvency of the program. The district court, however, found that the increased
cost of expanding it to include pregnancy "would not destroy the program," and held that,
in any case, the equal protection clause could not allow exclusion of pregnancy just because
the cost of inclusion might be prohibitive. 359 F. Supp. at 798-99. Second, counsel asserted
that female workers already collected a disproportionate share of benefits (28% of contribu-
tions versus 38% of benefits collected), and that to cover pregnancy would give women an
even greater share. The court, however, held that California could not limit benefits to
women on an actuarial basis if benefits to other groups were not limited by the same
method. Id. at 800. Third, counsel asserted that the benefits program would be subject to
abuse by women since pregnancy is voluntary. However, since not all pregnancy is volun-
tary and since other "voluntary" disabilities were covered by the program, the court held
that the scheme was not rationally related to achieving the stated purpose. Id Fourth,
counsel asserted that it is difficult to determine objectively when a worker is truly disabled
by a pregnancy-related condition. However, the court held that such disabilities are no
more susceptible to problems of proof than other claims. Id at 800-01.
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women are protected and men are not." 26 The Court's most forthright
treatment of the sex discrimination issue was relegated to the now in-
famous footnote 20:
[T]his case is ... a far cry from cases ... involving discrimination based
upon gender as such. The California insurance program does not ex-
clude anyone from benefit eligibility because of gender but merely
removes one physical condition - pregnancy - from the list of compen-
sable disabilities. While it is true that only women can become preg-
nant, it does not follow that every legislative classification concerning
pregnancy is a sex-based classification .... Normal pregnancy is an
objectively identifiable physical condition with unique characteristics.
Absent a showing that distinctions involving pregnancy are mere pre-
texts designed to effect an invidious discrimination against the
members of one sex or the other, lawmakers are constitutionally free
to include or exclude pregnancy from the coverage of legislation such
as this on any reasonable basis, just as with respect to any other
physical condition.
The lack of identity between the excluded disability and gender as
such under this insurance program becomes clear upon the most cur-
sory analysis. The program divides potential recipients into two
groups-pregnant women and nonpregnant persons. While the first
group is exclusively female, the second includes members of both
sexes. The fiscal and actuarial benefits of the program thus accrue to
members of both sexes.'
Thus, under Geduldig, "the link of the excluded disability with gender
was to be treated as essentially coincidental."'
After Geduldig, the question became whether its tortuous reasoning
could be untangled or confined to its facts, or whether the Court would
extend the "pregnant women/nonpregnant persons" distinction into
other factual and legal contexts. Since Geduldig concerned the
availability of benefits to female workers, the focus was naturally on
Title VII, the statutory prohibition against sex discrimination in
employment. Section 703(a)(1) of that statute provides that an employer
is forbidden "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."' The
first question, then, was whether discrimination against women under
Title VII would be understood in the pregnancy context as the same
kind of dissimilar treatment of persons similarly situated which the
equal protection clause is taken to forbid. If so, then the Supreme
Court's reasoning in Geduldig would preclude section 703(a)(1) from hav-
Id& at 496-97 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 496 n.20.
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-27, at 1071 (1978) (footnote omitted).42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1976).
[Vol. 56:375
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ing any effect on pregnancy discrimination; the statute prohibits only
sex discrimination, and, under Geduldig, classifications based on
pregnancy are not sex discrimination.
Equally important was whether section 703(a)(2)0 would be construed
in the gender or gender-related context in the same way in which it had
been in the racial context in Griggs v. Duke Power Co." Under section
703(a)(2) an employer may not "limit, segregate, or classify his
employees or applicants for employment in any way which would de-
prive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such in-
dividual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. ' ' 3' The Griggs
Court construed this section to prohibit the requirement that potential
employees take a standardized intelligence test, when such a require-
ment had a disproportionately negative impact on black applicants,
stating: "What is required by Congress is the removal of artificial, ar-
bitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers
operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other imper-
missible classification."' That is, according to Griggs, even when a
classification is racially neutral on its face, the showing of a dispropor-
tionate impact of that classification on a group protected by section
703(a)(2) is enough to establish a prima facie violation of Title VII. The
disproportionate impact method of proof in Title VII cases, or "effects
test," as it is sometimes called, was drastically elevated in significance
after the decision in Washington v. Davis4 precluded a similar method
of proof in equal protection clause cases. Davis established that a show-
ing of disproportionate impact without a showing of a discriminatory
purpose would be insufficient to sustain the constitutional claim.
Before the Supreme Court considered the issues, there were authori-
tative indications that Geduldig should have no effect on a Title VII
claim of pregnancy discrimination. A guideline promulgated in 1972 by
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)35 stated une-
quivocally that disability and sick leave benefits should be available for
pregnancy-related disabilities and absences on the same basis as for
other disabilities. 8 Moreover, seven courts of appeals had addressed,
Id. § 2000e-2(a)(2).
401 U.S. 424 (1971).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a}(2) (1976).
401 U.S. at 431 (emphasis added).
426 U.S. 229 (1976).
1 The EEOC is the agency charged by Congress with implementing Title VII. See 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
Disabilities caused or contributed to by pregnancy, miscarriage, abortion,
childbirth, and recovery therefrom are, for all job-related purposes, temporary
disabilities and should be treated as such under any health or temporary
disability insurance or sick leave plan available in connection with employ-
1981]
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directly or indirectly, the question of whether Geduldig would control
the outcome of a Title VII pregnancy discrimination claim and unani-
mously concluded that it would not.37 Perhaps most persuasive, after
Geduldig, the Supreme Court itself indicated the broad reach of Title
VII in comparison to constitutional causes when, in discussing the "dis-
proportionate impact" method of proof in Title VII cases, it stated: "We
are not disposed to adopt this more rigorous standard for the purposes
of applying the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments in cases such as
this."38 Interestingly, in spite of this accumulation of authority in the im-
mediate post-Geduldig era, commentaries of the time burgeoned with
warnings about the possible effects of Geduldig on Title VII claims.3 9
The most farfetched of these predictions were imminently to come true.
The questions of the meaning of sex/pregnancy discrimination under
Title VII and of the application of the disproportionate impact analysis
in pregnancy cases came before the Court in General Electric Co. v.
Gilbert" in 1976. The suit was a Title VII challenge to an employees'
disability insurance plan similar to that upheld in Geduldig. Two months
before Geduldig was decided, the district court had struck down the
plan on the grounds that the program was sex discriminatory on its
face.41 The Fourth Circuit affirmed after Geduldig was decided, holding
that Geduldig did not control in a Title VII challenge.2 The Supreme
Court disagreed. Noting that Congress has nowhere defined "discrimi-
ment . . . . [Benefits] shall be applied to disability due to pregnancy or
childbirth on the same terms and conditions as they are applied to the other
temporary disabilities.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(b) (1973).
' Satty v. Nashville Gas Co., 522 F.2d 850 (6th Cir. 1975), affd in part, vacated in part &
remanded, 434 U.S. 136 (1977); Hutchison v. Lake Oswego School Dist., 519 F.2d 961 (9th
Cir. 1975), vacated & remanded, 429 U.S. 1033 (1977); Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 519 F.2d
661 (4th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 429 U.S. 125 (1976); Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089 (5th Cir. 1975)
(dictum), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 940 (1976); Holthaus v. Compton & Sons, 514 F.2d 651 (8th
Cir. 1975) (by implication); Communication Workers of America v. A.T. & T., 513 F.2d 1024
(2d Cir. 1975), vacated & remanded, 429 U.S. 1033 (1977); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,
511 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated on other grounds, 424 U.S. 737 (1976) (district court's
order not appealable as final decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976)), final disposition
reported in 579 F.2d 236 (3d Cir. 1977) (vacating district court injunction in light of General
Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976)).
' Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 247-48 (1976) (equal protection challenge by black
applicants to verbal skills test administered to prospective District of Columbia
policemen).
' See, e.g., Bartlett, Pregnancy and the Constitution. The Uniqueness Trap, 62 CALIF.
L. REV. 1532 (1974); Larson, Sex Discrimination as to Maternity Benefits, 1975 DUKE L.J.
805; Peratis & Rindskopf, Pregnancy as a Sex Discrimination Issue, 2 WOMEN'S RIGHTS L.
REP. 26 (1975); Comment, Geduldig v. Aiello: Pregnancy Classifications and the Definition
of Sex Discrimination, 75 COLUM. L. REV, 441 (1975); Note, Title VII, Pregnancy and
Disability Payments: Women and Children Last, 44 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 381 (1976).
40 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
41 375 F. Supp. 367 (E.D. Va. 1974).
" 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1975).
[Vol. 56:375
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nation" for Title VII purposes, Mr. Justice Rehnquist found that the
equal protection cases "afford an existing body of law analyzing and
discussing that term in a legal context not wholly dissimilar to the con-
cerns which Congress manifested in enacting Title VII. ' 3 Having made
this connection between equal protection and Title VII analyses, the
Court could simply state: "Absent a showing of gender-based discrimi-
nation, as that term is defined in Geduldig, or a showing of gender-based
effect, there can be no violation of § 703(a)(1)."" Thus, in Gilbert the
Court found that the exclusion of pregnancy from General Electric's
disability plan, itself much like the plan at issue in Geduldig, was not a
gender-based discrimination at all. s
With regard to the disproportionate impact section of Title VII, the
Gilbert Court found that the respondent-plaintiffs had not met their
burden of proof. Relying explicitly on the Geduldig aggregate risk pro-
tection analysis, the Court stated:
The Plan, in effect .... is nothing more than an insurance package,
which covers some risks, but excludes others .... As there is no proof
that the package is in fact worth more to men than to women, it is im-
possible to find any gender-based discriminatory effect in this scheme
simply because women disabled as a result of pregnancy do not re-
ceive benefits; that is to say, gender-based discrimination does not
result simply because an employer's disability-benefits plan is less
than all-inclusive. For all that appears, pregnancy-related disabilities
constitute an additional risk, unique to women, and the failure to com-
pensate them for this risk does not destroy the presumed parity of
the benefits, accruing to men and women alike, which results from
the facially evenhanded inclusion of risks.
,3 429 U.S. at 133. For criticism of this transplantation, see House Hearings, supra note 3,
at 39-40 (statement of Susan D. Ross); Block, Pregnancy Disability Benefits, 1978 ANN.
SURVEY AM. L. 431.
The Court noted that the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals was "wrong in concluding that
the reasoning of Geduldig was not applicable.to an action under Title VII." 429 U.S. at 136.
It may indeed be that the circuit court misread Geduldig. It distinguished that case on the
ground that classifications under such an equal protection challenge needed only to be "ra-
tionally supportable," whereas Title VII's prohibition on discrimination is for all practical
purposes absolute. 519 F.2d at 667. That is, the circuit court suggested that even the
Geduldig Court' found the California program discriminatory, just not discriminatory
enough to sustain the equal protection challenge. Id at 666-67. It is clear now, of course,
that when the Geduldig Court found no discrimination, it was being altogether literal.
Thus, the harder question which might have been put to the Supreme Court in Gilbert was
whether, given that no sex discrimination existed for constitutional purposes, Congress
might have deemed such to be sex discrimination under its commerce clause power or,
alternatively, under its "enhanced" power under § 5 of the fourteenth amendment. For
discussion of the latter, see Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966). These considera-
tions are of some importance with regard to the scope of the 1978 Title VII amendment pro-
hibiting pregnancy discrimination. See notes 150-220 & accompanying text infra.
" 429 U.S. at 137 n.15.
" Id. at 136.
"1 429 U.S. at 138-39 (citation & footnotes omitted). The third means of making a prima
1981]
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Thus, the Court suggests that the plaintiffs would have had to show
that the entire package was worth more to men than to women in order
to prove a discriminatory effect. In light of the subsequent holding in City
of Los Angeles Department of Water & Power v. Manhart,7 it is not
clear that a reallocation of burdens or benefits based on this group
averaging technique would be permissible. While criticizing that
method of analysis is not the aim of this article, it is important to point
out that the group averaging, or "inclusion-focused analysis," has at
least two failures: first, it does not account for the fact that disabilities
exclusive to men were covered by the plan;48 and second, it fails to con-
sider that an individual woman may never have the opportunity to take
advantage of any benefits so that the notion of total "worth" is irrele-
vant to her rights. It thus ignores the principle of equal individual treat-
ment under the law.4
The convolutions of Geduldig and Gilbert reached new heights in
Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty.5 ° In that case, an employee challenged two
features of the employer's pregnancy policy on Title VII grounds. First,
under the policy, an employee on pregnancy leave could receive no sick
leave pay even though employees were compensated when absent due
to other nonoccupational illnesses or disabilities. Second, the employer,
although requiring pregnancy leave of indeterminate length, denied ac-
cumulated seniority to female employees returning to work after child-
bearing. If an employee was absent due to any other disability, he or she
not only retained accumulated seniority but continued to accrue seniority
while absent.
Following Gilbert, the Court found neither policy on its face to be sex-
ually discriminatory." On the question of disproportionate impact under
section 703(a)(2), however, the Court had to draw a line which, although
facie Title VII case is to show that the policy in question is a mere pretext for invidious dis-
crimination. As in Geduldig, the Gilbert Court found no evidence of pretext in the equal
protection context. See id. at 136; text accompanying notes 26-28 supra. This conclusion in
Gilbert is highly questionable since the trial court had specifically found that the exclusion
of pregnancy was at least partially discriminatorily motivated. See 375 F. Supp. at 383, 386.
" 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
"[The] plan also insures risks such as prostatectomies, vasectomies, and circumcisions
that are specific to the reproductive system of men and for which there exist no female
counterparts covered by the plan." 429 U.S. at 152 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
" For an excellent criticism of the inclusion-focused analysis, see Comment, Differential
Treatment of Pregnancy in Employment The Impact of General Electric Co. v. Gilbert and
Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 13 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 717, 729-38 (1978). For criticism of
Geduldig or Gilbert, see Coleman, Barefoot and Pregnant-Stilk Equal Protection for
Women in Light of Geduldig v. Aiello, 16 S. TEX. L.J. 211 (1975); French, All Things Being
Equal... General Electric Co. v. Gilbert: An Analysis, 7 J.L. & EDUC. 21 (1978); Comment,
Pregnancy-Based Discrimination-General Electric v. Gilbert and Alternative State
Remedies, 81 DICK. L. REV. 517 (1976); articles cited note 39 supra.
10 434 U.S. 136 (1977).
11 Id. at 140, 143-44.
[Vol. 56:375
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bizarre, was consistent with the reasoning of Geduldig and Gilbert. On
one hand, the Court held that the refusal to allow sick leave pay to preg-
nant workers did not affect women disproportionately. With regard to
the deprivation of seniority, however, the Court did find an imper-
missibly disproportionate impact on women in violation of section
703(a)(2). The Court distinguished Gilbert by saying:
Here, by comparison, petitioner has not merely refused to extend
to women a benefit that men cannot and do not receive, but has im-
posed on women a substantial burden that men need not suffer. The
distinction between benefits and burdens is more than one of seman-
tics. We held in Gilbert that § 703(a)(1) did not require that greater
economic benefits be paid to one sex or the other "because of their
differing roles in 'the scheme of human existence.'" . . . But that
holding does not allow us to read § 703(a)(2) to permit an employer to
burden female employees in such a way as to deprive them of employ-
ment opportunities because of their different role.52
The Court further distinguished its holdings with respect to the seniority
policy and the sick leave policy by its conclusion that the sick leave
policy could be challenged under section 703(a)(1) but not under section
703(a)(2).O The plaintiff in Satty could not, as a matter of law, attempt to
utilize the disproportionate impact doctrine as it is established under
section 703(a)(2), and did not prove disproportionate impact under sec-
tion 703(a)(1) since the sick leave policy in question was "for all intents
and purposes, the same as the ... [p]lan examined in Gilbert.'" ' Thus,
Id. at 142 (citation & footnote omitted).
The Court drew this conclusion from a narrow construction of the words "employment
opportunities or ... status as an employee" in § 703(a)(2):
[Ilt is difficult to perceive how exclusion of pregnancy from a disability in-
surance plan or sick-leave compensation program "would deprive any indi-
vidual of employment opportunities" or otherwise adversely affect his status
as an employee in violation of § 703(a)(2). The direct effect of the exclusion is
merely a loss of income for the period the employee is not at work; such an ex-
clusion has no direct effect upon either employment opportunities or job
status.... [Section] 703(a)(2) ... appear[s] to be the proper section of Title VII
under which to analyze questions of sick-leave or disability payments.
434 U.S. at 144-45. That is, the Court concludes that sick leave or disability benefits could
be challenged only as "compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" under
§ 703(a)(1).
I Id at 145. The plaintiff in Satty conceded the similarity of the GE and Nashville Gas
plans. A commentator, however, has persuasively argued that, even within the strictures of
Gilbert, sick leave should not be treated the same as disability benefits. See Erickson,
Pregnancy Discrimination: An Analytical Approach, 5 WOMEN'S RIGHTS L. REP. 83, 100-01
(1979). Sick leave is available in a limited quantity to be used for any purpose, and is
therefore like money in the bank as opposed to risk protection; hence, it would be impossi-
ble for a female employee to use more than her share of sick leave; a challenge to a sick
leave policy is not subject therefore to the claim that to allow sick leave for pregnancy
would discriminate against men. Id The force of this argument depends on how much the
Supreme Court relied on this reverse discrimination argument in Gilbert and Satty. See
notes 144-49 & accompanying text infra.
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the Satty decision rests on two express distinctions, one between
burdens and benefits and the other between sections 703(a)(1) and (a)(2).
These distinctions are at best tenuous. This reasoning has been
roundly criticized," and other more illuminating distinctions have been
suggested. One commentator has argued, for example, that the Court
appropriately perceived the seniority deprivation as somehow more
egregious than the refusal to allow sick leave pay," which results "merely
in loss of income."57 The commentators rightly point out that such a gut
reaction is hardly an appropriate basis for decision; their endorsement
of such a distinction on any level, however, belies ignorance of the real
status of women in the labor force. While seniority may be more impor-
tant than a few days' pay for the long-term company executive with ample
savings, regular compensation has at least as much meaning for a per-
son like the plaintiff in Satty, an underpaid female clerk who is less likely
than a male employee to see any rewards of the seniority system.-"
Another commentator has suggested that the operative distinction in
the case is between benefits such as seniority which impose no cost on
the employer 9 and sick leave benefits which do. The Court could not re-
ly on this distinction because cost differential is theoretically not a
1 24 LOYOLA L. REv. 290, 299 (1978); 24 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 247, 258 (1978); see Block,
Pregnancy Disability Benefits, 1978 ANN. SURVEY AM. L. 431, 44749; Erickson, supra note
54, at 94; cf Comment, Sex Discrimination- Court Narrows Gilbert-Some Pregnancy
Discrimination is Sex Related, 27 BUFFALO L. REV. 295, 304 (1978) (pointing out ways in
which Satty represents real progress after Gilbert).
Kirp & Robyn, Pregnancy, Justice, and the Justices, 57 TEX. L. REV. 947, 957-58
(1979).
5 434 U.S. at 145.
Women have been less likely than men to stay on a job, which naturally has an effect
on the benefits, including seniority, to which each woman will be entitled. In 1973, for exam-
ple, the median female worker, in each of several age groups, had held her current job for
about half as long as the median male worker in the same age group had held his job. See
U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR & JAPANESE MINISTRY OF LABOR, THE ROLE AND STATUS OF WOMEN
WORKERS IN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN 91 (1976) [hereinafter cited as WOMEN
WORKERS]. This is partly so because women who are fully-employed in private industry
receive only 59% of men's earnings, see note 106 infra, and therefore have less incentive to
stay on a job than men do, see note 188 & accompanying text infra. Further, in 1977, only
5.9/o of non-postal white collar federal government workers in grades earning $26,000 per
annum or more were women, whereas women comprised 72.2O/% of workers in the lower
grades, earning from $6,219 to $14,431 per annum. U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGE-
MENT, OCCUPATIONS OF FEDERAL WHITE-COLLAR WORKERS (1977). Also in 1973, approximately
35%/o of employed women had part-time status, as opposed to only 16% of employed men.
WOMEN WORKERS, supra, at 84. Normally, part-time workers take much longer to acquire
seniority, and many are not eligible for seniority benefits at all.
5' It can be argued that seniority systems impose a type of tax on the employer, and it
can be argued with equal force that seniority systems result in measurable economic gain
from, for example, increased motivation and improved efficiency for the employer. In any
given seniority situation, answers to the questions of what rewards are generated and for
whom will depend on the details of the system and the way in which the particular labor
force is described for purposes of measurement.
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defense to a prima facie Title VII violation." In reality, of course, the
specter of paying women to have children is rife in the three decisions
and haunts the subsequent congressional deliberations as well." The
cost differential distinction comes close to explaining the contortions of
Satty.
In his concurrence, Justice Stevens suggests a disturbing rationale
which comes most near the heart of this matter. Believing that pro-
grams restricting benefits for pregnancy are facially sexually discrimi-
natory to begin with, Stevens dissented in Gilbert.62 Although bound by
that decision to concur in Satty, Justice Stevens thought that the
distinctions advanced by the majority were "illusory,"' and therefore
found it necessary to search for a less convoluted method by which to
determine how, under the majority's general analysis, a facially neutral
seniority policy could have a discriminatory effect. Justice Stevens sug-
gests that the distinction advanced should actually be discrimination
against pregnancy as opposed to discrimination against women, explain-
ing: "This distinction may be pragmatically expressed in terms of
whether the employer has a policy which adversely affects a woman
beyond the term of her pregnancy leave."" Thus, the "formerly pregnant
person" may not be permanently disadvantaged. Since the group per-
manently disadvantaged would be exclusively female, a seniority policy
such as that in Satty would be sexually discriminatory. 5
If Justice Stevens is correct that, regardless of the details of the
challenged policy, our legal framework allows "the employer to treat
pregnancy leave as a temporal gap in the full employment status of a
woman,"66 Satty goes a step beyond Geduldig and Gilbert. It not only
shows pregnancy to be a judicially isolated phenomenon, but it also
draws the contours of that isolation: it shows how, to the judicial mind,
pregnancy fits into the flow of social life. One authority has termed Satty
a "ludicrous but predictable resolution"6 ' of the problem of interpreting
pregnancy issues within the meaning of Title VII. Satty is consistent
with the Geduldig distinction between nonpregnant persons and preg-
nant women and with the Geduldig result that the former are equal
under the law while the latter are not. In effect, the Court says that
women are protected in any situation only when pregnancy itself is
eliminated from that situation. The practical message to employers is:
10 See note 171 infra.
*, See notes 174-81 & accompanying text infra.
62 See 429 U.S. at 160-62.
434 U.S. at 154 (Stevens, J., concurring).
4 -It at 155.
Id at 156.
Id.
Telephone conversation with Wendy W. Williams, Assistant Professor of Law,
Georgetown University Law Center (April 18, 1978).
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"If a woman is pregnant, you may treat her as you please. Once she's no
longer pregnant, treat her as a person."
Of course, pregnancy cannot be eliminated from the scenario if the
law is to respond to the real experience of women. Next, this article ad-
dresses the question of whether the "progress" achieved in the
Supreme Court during the last decade lays a foundation for a more just
treatment of pregnancy.
Judicial Attitudes Towards Women: Are They Really Changing?
The pregnancy decisions arguably stem from the Court's biases and
failure to comprehend the realities of working mothers' situations. If
this is the case, other Justices with open minds and better information
would produce different results. 8
The Standard of Review in Equal Protection Cases
In the days following the decision in Reed v. Reed,69 there was
speculation that the Court was beginning to be concerned seriously with
sex discrimination. At least, it was thought, the Court had formulated in
Reed an intermediate standard of review," one not as rigorous as "strict
scrutiny,"7 but still more searching than the "rational relationship"
" Some optimism is generated by facts portraying ever-increasing numbers of women in
law schools, in law practice and on the bench. Whatever changes may be wrought by female
litigators and jurists are eagerly anticipated, but it is not wise to rely on that process for
two obvious reasons. First, there is no guarantee that female judges will have any par-
ticular sympathies by virtue of their gender. As the bloody battle over ratification of the
ERA demonstrates, women are no more likely than men to agree on any issues, including
those which most profoundly affect their lives. Second, even the recently fantasized all-
female Supreme Court would be subject to many constraints. See Sweet, Shirley
Hufstedler and the Supremes, Ms., May, 1980, at 53 (listing Hon. Betty B. Fletcher, Hon.
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sec'y Patricia Roberts Harris, Sec'y Shirley Mount Hufstedler, Prof.
Barbara Jordan, Prof. Herma Hill Kay, Hon. Constance Baker Motley, Hon. Eleanor
Holmes Norton and Hon. Patricia McGowan Wald). As one female state supreme court
justice has described her situation:
You have to remember, and I have to remember, that I do not write on a clean
slate. I write on a slate that's been marked up . . . . For a consistent
jurisprudence in my state I must fit within the marks on that slate. It doesn't
mean I can't erase, it doesn't mean I can't write large. It just means that I
write on that slate in a particular context.
Remarks of Justice Shirley Abrahamson, Wisconsin Supreme Court, Celebration 25: A
Generation of Women at Harvard Law School, Cambridge, MA (April 15, 1978).
" 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (statute favoring males over females as probate administrators can-
not be justified on grounds of administrative convenience).
70 See, e.g., Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term, Foreword.- In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court. A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1,
30 (1972).
" If the challenged legislative classification is inherently "suspect" or infringes on a
"fundamental right," the Court will subject the legislation to the strictest scrutiny, requir-
ing the state to show that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state in-
terest. See L. TRIBE, supra note 28, §§ 16-12 to -13.
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test, 2 which had so undermined the cause of women's rights in Goesaert
v. Cleary73 and Hoyt v. Florida.74 The Reed Court stated that a classifica-
tion based on sex "'must rest upon some ground of difference having a
fair and substantial relation to the object of legislation.' ,,7"
Finding implicit support in Reed, four Justices declared two years
later in Frontiero v. Richardson78 that classifications based on sex should
be suspect. Justice Brennan, speaking as well for Justices Douglas,
White and Marshall, thought the higher level of scrutiny justified due
to: first, "the high visibility of the sex characteristic";77 second, our
"long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination ... rationalized by
an attitude of 'romantic paternalism' which, in practical effect, put
women not on a pedestal, but in a cage";78 third, the persistence of sex
discrimination; fourth, the immutable nature of the sex characteristic;
fifth, the fact that women "are vastly underrepresented in this Nation's
decisionmaking councils";79 and sixth, the fact that "Congress has itself
manifested an increasing sensitivity to sex-based classifications."8
Underlying this enumeration of factors was the Justices' perception
that "the sex characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to
perform or contribute to society."8
The next women's rights case" before the Supreme Court on an equal
72 Basically, a legislative classification not based upon any suspect criterion nor infring-
ing upon a fundamental right need only bear a rational relationship to any legitimate state
objective in order to survive an equal protection challenge. See id. § 16-12.
71 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (law precluding most females from being barmaids reasonably
related to preventing moral and social problems).
' 368 U.S. 57 (1961) (statute requiring females to preregister in order to be eligible for
jury service rationally related to purpose of allowing women time for home and family
responsibilities).
78 404 U.S. at 76 (quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)).
If 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality decision) (equal protection violated by regulation requir-
ing male dependents of female army officer, but not female dependents of male officer, to
prove dependency).
Id. at 686.
11 Id. at 684.
7, Id at 686 n.17.
I Id. at 687. The sixth criterion refers to congressional passage of the ERA. Justice
Powell, however, stated that the pendency of the ERA militated against applying strict
scrutiny to gender classifications, because the Court should not pre-empt "a major political
decision." Id. at 692 (Powell, J., concurring). Commentators have cited Justice Powell's posi-
tion as an argument in favor of ERA ratification. See, e.g., Ginsburg, The Equal Rights
Amendment Is the Way, 1 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 19, 24-25 (1978). Although this is probably
a realistic assessment of judicial inertia and a sound political stand, it is possible to assert
that Justice Powell's position is a strictly positivist "cop-out." See also Erickson, Women
and the Supreme Court. Anatomy Is Destiny, 41 BROOKLYN L. REV. 209, 229 (1974) (arguing
that Justice Powell would never have advanced such a rationale in a race discrimination
context).
1, 411 U.S. 686 (emphasis added).
0 After Frontiero and before Geduldig, the Supreme Court decided Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973). Arguably Roe is not a women's rights case at all, and the Court's failure to
decide it as such has made possible the recent disastrous developments in the area of abor-
tion. E.g., Harris v. McRae, 100 S. Ct. 2671 (1980).
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protection theory was Geduldig. Since the Court refused to find a
classification on the basis of sex, it did not discuss the appellees' argu-
ment that sex is a suspect classification.13
The most significant moment in this lengthy effort to achieve a higher
standard of review in equal protection sex discrimination cases came
two years later in Craig v. Boren.84 Though the Court relied for its
holding on prior cases, the standard it proclaimed appears distinctly
more stringent than those previously applied: "[C]lassifications by
gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be sub-
stantially related to achievement of those objectives."85 In Craig, the
constitutionality of an Oklahoma statute which prohibited the sale of
3.2% beer to males under the age of twenty-one and to females under
the age of eighteen was at issue." The Court subjected the evidence
supporting the state's justifications to tough statistical scrutiny, de-
manding a consistent empirical showing of the relationship between
ends and means.8" The state's evidence which was examined and re-
jected by the majority might well have been sufficient for it to have
deferred to the legislative judgment under the rational relationship or
even the Reed test. However, the Court found the gender-based dif-
ferential unconstitutional, suggesting a new standard with some real
bite. The Court has subsequently applied the Craig standard to in-
validate a gender-based classification in Orr v. Orr.' There, the
challenge was to an Alabama alimony statute which provided that hus-
bands, but not wives, could be required to pay alimony upon divorce.89
The Court, recognizing and rejecting "the baggage of sexual stereo-
" Brief for Appellees at 48-54, Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
" 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
' Id, at 197; cf. i& 211-14 (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that the present three-tiered
equal protection scheme is really a way of describing single approach to many kinds of prob-
lems, different results depending on gravity of particular challenge).
" OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 37, §§ 241, 245 (West 1958 & Supp. 1980).
" The Court concluded, first, the state's evidence of a substantially disproportionate
number of arrests of 18 to 20 year old males for driving under the influence and for
drunkenness was not persuasive in that it did not reveal that the disproportion was confin-
ed to that age group, 429 U.S. at 200 n.8; second, the state's evidence of a great number of
males aged 17 to 21 killed or injured in traffic accidents drew no correlation between those
numbers and levels of intoxication, id at 201 n.9; third, a random roadside survey allegedly
indicating that young males were more inclined to drink and drive was not probative
because, inter alia, the differentials between males and females were too small and the age
differentials actually suggested a lower "involvement with alcohol" by youths, id at 201,
203 n.16; fourth, FBI statistics showing more males arrested for driving while intoxicated
drew no correlation between the number of arrests and age nor between arrests and beer
drinking, as opposed to drinking other intoxicants, id. at 201 n.11; and fifth, statistics from
other jurisdictions offered to show the pervasiveness of youthful involvement in accidents
following the ingestion of alcohol apparently did not show any gender correlation, id at 201.
" 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
" ALA. CODz §§ 30-2-51 to -52 (1975) (amendment 1979); Act of 1933, ch. 128, § 7420, 1933
Ala. Acts 119 (repealed 1979).
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types,"'" suggested that "[t]here is no reason ... to use sex as a proxy
for need." 1 The line of cases beginning with Reed and Frontiero has
been described by one authority as having invalidated laws or regula-
tions which "shared an important characteristic in terms of impact on
behavior: All either prevented, or economically discouraged, departures
from 'traditional' sex roles, freezing biology into social destiny."92 The
same can surely be said of the laws invalidated in Craig and Orr.
Although no enhanced standard of review will make a difference if
the Supreme Court persists in its reasoning that classifications based on
pregnancy are not gender classifications per se, the new standard ar-
ticulated in Craig could even change the Geduldig result if this initial
hurdle were overcome. 3 While it can be assumed that the state in-
terests asserted in Geduldig would today be held to be important
governmental objectives, a re-examination of the evidence underlying
the decision in Geduldig in light of the decision in Craig reveals that the
relationship between the purpose and the actual program is inadequate
in a number of ways.
The Geduldig Court seems to have been impressed by three factual
assertions. First, California asserted that in recent years the disability
plan in its pregnancy-exclusionary form had paid out 90% to 103% of
existing revenues. If the Court first allowed that the exclusion is a
gender classification and then applied Craig-type scrutiny, it presumably
would be influenced by this evidence only if the evidence were accom-
panied by certain other facts, such as to whom and for what disabilities
the revenues were paid and the percentage of payments which compen-
sated male-exclusive disabilities. In response to California's argument
that pregnancy disability claims were for unnecessarily long absences
and for purposes other than the disability of the employee,95 the Court
would ask what measures the state took to prevent abuse by nonpreg-
"440 U.S. at 283.
" I& at 281.
92 L. TRIE, supra note 28, § 16-25, at 1065.
0 See notes 109-49 & accompanying text infra.
Arguably the Craig standard has not yet undergone a strenuous test; both Craig and
Orr involved matters of less than earth-shattering proportions. That is, whether 18 to 21
year-old males in Oklahoma can buy 3.2% beer or whether some Alabama husbands can
receive alimony will not have the repercussions that a mandate that all states pay disability
benefits to pregnant workers would. Moreover, both Craig and Orr involved discrimination
against males, thus perhaps speaking more forcefully to the Court. But cf. Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. at 219-22 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that rational relationship test should
apply to discrimination against males).
" 417 U.S. at 492-93.
," Brief for Appellant at 20. As a typical example of the lack of concern for the empirical
validation of stereotypes, California cited only a pregnancy and childbirth manual which
suggested that the milk would be improved if nursing mothers took a nap each day as sup-
port for its assertion that workers would take leave past the time of their own disability in
order to care for the child. See id. at 20 n.25.
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nant claimants and what evidence California could produce as to the pro-
pensity of pregnant workers to cheat the system. 6
Second, the Court stated that, although there was disagreement as to
the actual increment,97 the cost to the system of covering pregnancy
benefits "would clearly be substantial."98 In order to decide whether the
exclusion of pregnancy disabilities was substantially related to the
achievement of the governmental objectives, the estimate of cost would
need to be given some content. For example, evidence is needed regard-
ing the length of absence upon which the state's cost estimates are based.
California based its figures on an average absence of thirteen to fifteen
weeks,99 while the average time most often quoted by experts is six
weeks."0 Furthermore, information indicating the estimated number of
pregnancies per year in the work force, any estimated increase in the
cost to the state, as compared to the state's past contribution to the
benefits pool, and whether the state takes into consideration savings
resulting from reduced welfare payments is needed. The state would
also need to account for the differences between its cost estimates and
data describing the real experiences in other states. In 1973, for exam-
ple, Hawaii amended its law to require that pregnancy be treated like
any other disability in an employer's disability benefits package.'"' None
of the major insurers in that state were compelled to raise their rates
due to the inclusion of pregnancy in disability schemes; indeed, those
that did so prematurely subsequently lowered their rates because their
estimates of increased cost had been grossly inflated.'
9 These arguments asserting new mothers' tendency to abuse the disability system
reappeared in the legislative history of the pregnancy amendment to Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e(k) (Supp. III 1979). For example, one actuary testified: "We are not talking about a
disability that can be checked by a physician to see if the individual is still disabled, and if
not she should go back to work." House Hearings, supra note 3, at 119 (statement of Paul
Jackson).
' The state asserted that cost would increase by $120.2 million (33%) to $131 million
(36%) annually; appellees asserted an increase of only $48.9 million (12%) annually. 417 U.S.
at 494 n.18.
I d2 at 493-94.
Brief for Appellant at 30-31.
"® See, e.g., House Hearings, supra note 3, at 60 (statement of Dr. Andre Hellegers)
(90-95/o of pregnant workers lose six weeks or less). Moreover, the Hawaii experience, see
note 101 infra, revealed the average absence for disabled male employees to be 5.1 weeks,
while the average absence for female employees, including for pregnancy and pregnancy-
related disabilities, to be only 4.4 weeks. House Hearings, supra note 3, at 214 (statement of
Ruth Weyand).
I HAWAII REV. STAT. § 392-3(5) (1976). Though the Hawaii statute involves a require-
ment of nondiscrimination in employer-provided benefits (much like 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)
(Supp. II 1979)) rather than a state-administered employee-funded program, such as was at
issue in Geduldig, significant differences between the two might have been factored out to
arrive at appropriate figures describing the cost of pregnancy, which the Supreme Court,
for all practical purposes, just assumed to be "substantial."
1"8 House Hearings, supra note 3, at 199-228 (statement of Ruth Weyand).
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Third, the Supreme Court noted that female workers in California
contributed 28% of the plan's revenues but received 380/o of the plan's
benefits. ' Though the Geduldig Court appears not to rely on this
statistic, the reasoning made explicit in Gilbert and Satty demonstrates
how this notion of possible "discrimination against men" which results
from including pregnancy in disability insurance is crucial to the Court's
understanding of the pregnancy issue."' In attempting to discover what
the footnoted statistic reveals, it first should be noted that the contribu-
tion rates under the California scheme depend on wages; if a group
uniformly earns less, its contributions to the disability program would
be less. Moreover, California asserted as one of its purposes the
maintenance of lower contribution rates for lower-paid workers."5
Under the circumstances, the Court might have inquired into the rela-
tive earning levels of male and female workers ' rather than being in-
fluenced by a bald statistic. Also in this regard, it is interesting to note
that low income workers do submit a disproportionate number of dis-
ability claims, a statistic which holds true for both lower paid male and
female laborers.'0 Whatever reasons explain this phenomenon, it is
clear that income level is a better indicator of predicted disability rates
than is gender.
Thus, it is likely that an application of the Craig standard to Geduldig
would illuminate the unpersuasiveness of the evidence relied upon in
that case. Again, the Craig standard cannot be applied if the Court con-
tinues to deny that pregnancy discrimination is sex discrimination. The
chances that this initial obstacle can be overcome must be considered
next.
The Consistent Posture of the Supreme Court
One of the most encouraging aspects of Orr v. Orr'8 is that it directly,
though offhandedly, analogizes race discrimination to sex discrimina-
tion. In giving unusually short shrift to a difficult standing problem, the
Court stated:
There is no question but that Mr. Orr bears a burden he would not
bear were he female. The issue is highlighted, although not altered,
by transposing it to the sphere of race. There is no doubt that a state
10 417 U.S. at 497 n.21.
See notes 144-49 & accompanying text infra.
" See note 24 & accompanying text supra.
10 In 1956, fully-employed women nationwide earned 63% of the amount earned by men;
by 1970, this figure had dropped to 59%. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, WOMEN'S BUREAU, 1975
HANDBOOK ON WOMEN WORKERS, BULL. No. 297, at 4.
00, House Hearings, supra note 3, at 24 (statement of Wendy W. Williams).
104 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
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law imposing alimony obligations on blacks but not whites could be
challenged by a black who was required to pay. The burden alone is
sufficient to establish standing.1'
This reasoning, whatever its scope, is a welcome sight to feminist
litigators who have attempted to impress such an analogy between race
and sex upon the Court for some time. That is, insofar as one's sex, like
one's race, is an unalterable, accidental and identifying trait which bears
no relation to one's abilities but nonetheless subjects one to disadvan-
tageous treatment, it should be given no legal cognizance. Moreover, the
Supreme Court over a quarter of a century ago remotely hinted that it
might be open to such an analogy.
In Brown v. Board of Education,0 that Court cited Gunnar Myrdal's
An American Dilemma"' for the conclusion that racial segregation re-
tards the development of black children and deprives them of equal educa-
tional benefits. In that 1944 classic, Myrdal persuasively argued that
there were parallels between race and sex. He asserted that the subjec-
tion of both groups resulted from the economic and ideological, pater-
nalistic scheme of life. Because of the stereotypes to which women as
well as blacks are subject, they face similar obstacles: "The most impor-
tant disabilities still affecting [a woman's] status are those barring her
attempt to earn a living and to attain promotion in her work."'1
Acknowledging that, for blacks and for women, there was "a tremen-
dous difference both in actual status of these different groups and in the
tone of sentiment in the respective relations,""' Myrdal asserted that
both groups continued to face problems despite the decline of pater-
nalism as an ideal and the erosion of its economic base."' If the Court
relied on Myrdal for its historic conclusion concerning the inherent evils
of race discrimination, it could have done the same for sex discrimina-
tion. It is therefore not at all surprising to find Myrdal's study cited by
the appellants in Reed v. Reed, who argued that the Court should treat
sex discrimination similarly to race discrimination.''
" Id. at 273 (emphasis added). There were also substantial questions about the
timeliness of Mr. Orr's constitutional claim, id. at 274-75, and the existence of independent
and adequate state grounds for decision, id. at 275-78. The Court's treatment of these ques-
tions may be inconsistent with prior jurisdictional law, see id. at 290-300 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting), but at least for the first time in a sex discrimination case the sort of "damn the
torpedoes" approach which claimants have enjoyed in other civil rights contexts was
evidenced.
,, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
"' G. MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA (20th anniversary ed. 1964), cited in 347 U.S. at
494 n.11.
"I G. MYRDAL, supra note 111, app. 5, at 1077.
.. Id. at 1073.
.. Id. at 1078.
"I Brief for Appellants at 15-19.
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That the Court in Orr acknowledged the parallel between race and
sex is heartening. The analogy, however, will not serve to resolve the
pregnancy dilemma for an obvious reason. As Myrdal put it:
In the final analysis, women are still hindered in their competition 'by
the function of procreation; Negroes are laboring under the yoke of
the doctrine of unassimilability which has remained although slavery
is abolished. The second barrier is actually much stronger than the
first in America today. But the first is more eternally inexorable.119
The Reed appellants also acknowledged this limitation on the analogy
between race and sex in a fundamentally ambivalent way. Emphasizing
that the legislative classification preferring males as probate adminis-
trators was unrelated to any biological difference between the sexes,
the appellants quoted the following passage from a seminal law review
article: "To the degree women perform the function of motherhood, they
differ from other special groups. But maternity legislation is not sex
legislation; its benefits are geared to the performance of a special ser-
vice much like veterans' legislation."'
1 7
The present question is whether we can rely on the Justices to bridge
this traditional separation for females between maternal and other func-
tions. There are three cases which arguably demonstrate an increased
sensitivity to the women's dilemma. First, in Stanton v. Stanton,'8 a
Utah statute set the age of majority for females at eighteen and for
males at twenty-one because, among other reasons, males need to be
supported while they obtain the education and training necessary to
provide for their own families. In invalidating the statute, Justice
Blackmun stated for the majority:
No longer is the female destined solely for the home and the rearing
of the family, and only the male for the marketplace and the world of
ideas .... To distinguish between the two on educational grounds is
to be self-serving: if the female is not to be supported so long as the
male, she hardly can be expected to-attend school as long as he does,
and bringing her education to an end earlier coincides with the role-
typing society has long imposed."'
The second indication of improved attitudes is Justice Stevens' dissent
in Mathews v. Lucas.1"° In that case, illegitimate children brought an
equal protection challenge to a Social Security Act provision which, in
11 G. MYRDAL, supra note 111, app. 5, at 1078 (footnote omitted).
,, Brief for Appellants at 19 n.18 (quoting Murray & Eastwood, Jane Grow and the Law:
Sex Discrimination and Title VII, 34 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 232, 239 (1965)). For a discussion
of the implications of characterizing childbearing as a "special service," see notes 253-352 &
accompanying text infra.
,' 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
, Id. at 14-15.
IN 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
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providing survivors' benefits to dependent children, established a
presumption of dependency for legitimate children, while illegitimates
were forced to prove dependency. The Supreme Court held the classifi-
cation was reasonably related to the likelihood of dependency at the
time of the death of the provider. Justice Stevens stated in dissent:
Habit, rather than analysis, makes it seem acceptable and natural to
distinguish between male and female, alien and citizen, legitimate and
illegitimate; for too much of our history there was the same inertia in
distinguishing between black and white. But that sort of stereotyped
reaction may have no rational relationship -other than pure pre-
judicial discrimination-to the stated purpose for which the classifica-
tion is being made.12
1
Certainly, it is encouraging to find the above-quoted language in the
United States Reports.2
The third case which arguably demonstrates an increased sensitivity
to women's rights is Turner v. Department of Employment Security.'"
In Turner, the Court invalidated a Utah statute which made pregnant
women ineligible for unemployment compensation for a period extend-
ing from twelve weeks before the expected date of birth to six weeks
after delivery. Unemployment was available to anyone else who was
unemployed but available for employment. The ineligibility provision
rested on an irrebuttable presumption that women are unable to work
during the designated eighteen-week period, which the court found to
violate the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 4
This decision, though laudable in result, suffers from two major
defects. The first is found in the opinion's only footnote. Utah contended,
citing Geduldig, that the provision was a limitation on the coverage of
the state unemployment compensation system. The Court rejected the
contention because the Utah Supreme Court, not having had the
Geduldig argument before it, had rested its decision on the claim by the
respondents that "near term pregnancy is an endemic condition relating
to employability."" The clear implication of the footnote is that the
121 Id at 520-21 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
1 Of course, it has become clear that Justices Blackmun and Stevens are not necessarily
representative of a majority of the Supreme Court with regard to some women's rights
issues. See Harris v. McRae, 100 S. Ct. 2671 (1980).
2 423 U.S. 44 (1975) (per curiam). To suggest that this case demonstrates increased sen-
sitivity on the part of the Supreme Court, however, may be to misconstrue, or at least
overestimate, the attitudes of the Justices.
'" Id. at 46. The doctrine prohibiting irrebuttable presumptions under the due process
clause is not fully explored in this article. As this section suggests, the doctrine has not pro-
duced completely satisfactory results, and, in any case, the Court appears to have tacitly
agreed with Justice Rehnquist that the doctrine sweeps too broadly. See Cleveland Bd. of
Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 657-60 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See also Bezanson,
Some Thoughts on the Emerging Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine, 7 IND. L. REv. 644
(1974).
1"2 423 U.S. at 45 n.*.
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Court would have reached a different result in Turner had the Utah
opinion mentioned the "coverage limitations on insurance principles cen-
tral to [Geduldig]."'126 This implication hardly argues for a substantive
value change on the part of the Justices. The second defect in Turner
results from the fact that the decision was controlled by Cleveland
Board of Education v. LaFleur,'2 the reasoning of which sharply il-
lustrates the limit of judicial willingness to extend constitutional protec-
tion to women in their procreative capacities. There the Supreme Court
invalidated on due process grounds a school board regulation which re-
quired that a pregnant teacher take unpaid leave five months before the
expected delivery and prohibited her return to work until three months
after childbirth. Among the purposes recited for such a regulation, the
majority found the "necessity of keeping physically unfit teachers out of
the classroom" to be legitimate and the only purpose to which the classi-
fication was rationally related.'" However, Justice Stewart, writing for
the majority, determined that the rule was an overbroad irrebuttable
presumption of physical incompetence, "'not necessarily or universally
true in fact,' 'n and therefore a violation of the due process requirement
of individual determination of fitness. This governmental intrusion was
found to be especially unfounded in the realm of marriage and family
life. ' The Court invalidated on similar grounds that limitation on a
teacher's ability to return to work.
At least in the case of mandatory leave before delivery, LaFleur
would seem to have finally put the decisions concerning childbirth in the
hands of the woman bearing the child, thus endorsing the feminist tenet
that a woman must have the right to control her reproductive life. Un-
fortunately, a footnote in that decision undermines this apparent incor-
poration of a crucial feminist value:
This is not to say that the only means for providing appropriate
protection for the rights of pregnant teachers is an individualized
determination in each case and in every circumstance. We are not
dealing in these cases with maternity leave regulations requiring a
termination of employment at some firm date during the last few
weeks of pregnancy. We therefore have no occasion to decide whether
such regulations might be justified by considerations not presented in
these records .... 131
The Court went on to suggest that evidence of widespread medical con-
sensus about disabling effects on job performance during the last few
414 U.S. 632 (1974).
" Id. at 643.
12 Id. at 644 (quoting Viandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452 (1973)).
"3 The Court cited, inter alia, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 413 (1973), and Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438 (1972).
"1 414 U.S. at 647 n.13.
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weeks or evidence that such a regulation was the only reasonable means
to avoid the commencement of labor in the classroom might justify such
a regulation.132 Not only is the decision as to reinstatement in a physi-
cian's hands, but the entire individual determination approach is in prin-
ciple abandoned to a generalized perception, or "documented" stereo-
type, of the relation between pregnancy and employment. The stinging
footnote phenomenon seems to be chronic.
LaFleur expressly allows that it is appropriate for someone other
than the female worker to decide how pregnancy will affect her employ-
ment. The traditional arrangements which have the ultimate effect of
penalizing pregnancy are left untouched. Moreover, it is possible to
speculate that the Justices consciously endorsed the imposition of that
penalty by not acknowledging the evidence adduced at trial that the
school board allowed pregnant teachers to work on an unpaid basis
through the eighth month of pregnancy.'" This fact belies the state's
contention that the purpose of the regulation was to insure physically
competent teachers.
In this sense, Turner is to LaFleur as Satty is to Gilbert. Taken
together, the contours of legal restrictions on women in society are
made explicit: there is some quality in the phenomenon of pregnancy
that justifies isolating women from the social mainstream and forcing
them to be dependent on others. LaFleur, read generously, mandates
that lawmakers cannot assume when this divestiture of citizenship at-
taches. Turner makes it clear that once an individual determination
shows the specialness to have commenced, there is no longer any dis-
pute as to whether a woman deserves compensation. This is another
angle of the picture drawn by Gilbert and Satty: women need only be
treated as persons when they are not engaged in their childbearing
function.
Though some of the Justices do show greatly improved understand-
ing and sympathy, the issue of pregnancy demonstrates that their pre-
sumptions regarding women have not changed substantially. Decision-
makers are becoming aware that women in responsible positions are
just as intelligent, competent and effective as their male counterparts.
Such recognition is a far cry, however, from realizing the implications
the reproductive capability has on one's destiny. No matter how sensi-
tive attitudes are towards women in society, pregnant persons are not
in that society.
This fundamental failure to recognize the inequities generated by
biological differences is best focused by comparing Justice Rehnquist's
132 Id.
'" Brief for Petitioners at 81-88 app.
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opinion in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert'" with that of the district
court judge.185 Having decided that General Electric's plan was not
facially discriminatory," 8 Justice Rehnquist "resolved" the question of
discriminatory impact by an actuarial comparison of benefits flowing to
women and men. Apparently realizing, however, that this comparison
was vulnerable to an inquiry as to why pregnancy should be the excluded
risk, he went on to state: "Pregnancy is of course confined to women,
but it is in other ways significantly different from the typical covered
disease or disability. The District Court found that it is not a 'disease' at
all, and is often a voluntarily undertaken and desired condition.""1 7 That
Justice Rehnquist referred to the district court's finding on this topic is
ironic, since the finding there led to a diametrically different result.
What he omitted to note was that the district court found pregnancy to
be a disability, even if not a disease in the commonly understood sense.",
More important, the district judge stated that "'voluntariness' in this
sense is meaningless." '39 Other commentators have thoroughly devas-
tated the Court's reliance on qualities allegedly unique to pregnancy:"'0
the disability plans challenged in Geduldig and Gilbert covered almost
all other disabling conditions, regardless of the degree of disabling ef-
fect, voluntariness, uniqueness to males, predictability, costliness or ef-
fect on future participation in the work force."" Pregnancy was singled
out, not because of any characteristic of the condition itself, but rather
because the Justices perceived that a woman's role is to bear children
and that women should bear the cost of childbearing just as they have
always done.
This perception is demonstrated by the different treatments of the
cost issue by the Supreme Court and by the Gilbert district court. The
Supreme Court in Geduldig noted in passing that women employees ac-
tually received a proportionately greater share than men of the benefits
disbursed under the California plan."' Again in Gilbert, the Court re-
ferred to evidence introduced in the district court that, "with preg-
nancy-related disabilities excluded, the cost of the Plan to General Elec-
tric per female employee was at least as high, if not substantially higher
than, the cost per male employee."1 3 The Court suggested that to in-
'" 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
1 375 F. Supp. 367 (E.D. Va. 1974).
' See text accompanying notes 45-46 supra.
429 U.S. at 136.
'u See 375 F. Supp. 367, 375 (E.D. Va. 1974).
"' Id.
140 See, e.g., Bartlett, supra note 39.
" See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 128 (1976); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S.
484, 487 (1973).
417 U.S. 484, 497 n.21 (1974).
141 429 U.S. at 130 n.10.
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elude pregnancy in the risks covered by the plan, if the inclusion
resulted in an actuarial imbalance, would amount to sex discrimination
against the male employees.'" In Satty, the Court again intimated that
an opposite holding in Gilbert would have constituted preferential treat-
ment for women workers.1 4 5
Assuming that the Court is correct in its economic assessment, and ig-
noring the legal inadequacies of the actuarial approach, how should this
alleged imbalance be treated? The district court judge in Gilbert faced
the issue squarely. Although he had found that the inclusion of pregnancy
would increase costs by some amount,"' he observed that under the pre-
sent policy "the consequence of a female employee exercising her innate
right to bear a child may well result in economic disaster [while] [n]o
such consequences would befall a male employee who chose to subject
himself to a selective operation."1 7 He stated that even upon a showing
that the inclusion of pregnancy would operate to discriminate against
men economically, his conclusion would be the same:
If it be viewed as a greater economic benefit to women, then this is a
simple recognition of women's biologically more burdensome place in
the scheme of human existence .... [T]here must be this one excep-
tion to the cost differential defense .... Practically speaking, pregnancy
is peculiar in that not only is procreation a necessary element of
human existence, but it is one which is virtually taken for granted
despite the unequal social taxes it imposes.'"
To this candid assessment, the Supreme Court replied in a footnote:
Title VII's proscription on discrimination does not require ... the
employer to pay that incremental amount. The District Court was
wrong in assuming, as it did, that Title VII's ban on employment dis-
crimination necessarily means that "greater economic benefit[s]"
must be required to be paid to one sex or the other because of their
differing roles in "the scheme of human existence." ' 9
This is not just a disagreement about the scope of Title VII: it is an open
conflict of values about women's place, about substantive equality. It is
significant to note that where the district court referred to women's
"biologically more burdensome place," the Supreme Court replaced the
term with "differing roles." The respective normative implications are
unmistakable.
14, Id at 140 n.18.
... See 434 U.S. 136, 144 (1977).
1 375 F. Supp. at 378. The district court judge was understandably skeptical of the
defendant's assertion that the inclusion of pregnancy would increase the cost of the disability
plan by 300 to 330%. Id
", Id. at 381. The district court judge noted that one employee, having become uninten-
tionally pregnant, had to resort to welfare aid. However, before receiving the aid, her elec-
tricity and gas service had been cut off. Id. at 381 n.12. See also House Hearings, supra note
3, at 50 (statement of Sherrie O'Steen).
148 375 F. Supp. at 383.
, 429 U.S. at 139 n.17.
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At the risk of redundancy, it must again be stressed that the Su-
preme Court's improving attitude extends to women only as long as
they are not pregnant: the issue at hand is how the law will account for
childbearing and, to some extent, childrearing. Congress has attempted
to address the former, but, as will be seen, the values animating that
enactment fall somewhere between the polar views expressed by the
district court judge and Justice Rehnquist in Gilbert.
THE CONGRESS AND PREGNANCY
The Supreme Court decision in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,"w an-
nounced on December 7, 1976, brought swift reaction in Congress. On
March 15, 1977, bills which were expressly intended to overcome the
Gilbert result were introduced in both the Senate and the House.151 The
original bills and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) ' which was
eventually adopted had a simple design: to add to the "definitions" sec-
tion of Title VII a provision which would define pregnancy discrimina-
tion as sex discrimination prohibited by the statute. This approach has
two advantages: first, it straightforwardly addresses the definitional
obstacle created by the Supreme Court; and second, it eliminates the
need to rely on the disproportionate impact doctrine in Title VII chal-
lenges to pregnancy classifications.'3
As of October 31, 1978, employers are forbidden by the PDA to dis-
criminate on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth or related medical condi-
10 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
151 H.R. 5055, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 7658 (1977) (amended and reintroduced
as H.R. 6075, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REc. 10463 (1977)); S. 995, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess., 123 CONG. REC. 7538 (1977). The original House and Senate bills were substantially
similar, with one notable exception; H.R. 6075, as amended in committees, provided that af-
fected employers need not pay for abortions. H.R. REP. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 7,
reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4749, 4755. The Senate had earlier re-
jected a similar abortion exclusion, 123 CONG. REC. 29659 (1977), but the exception was
subsequently agreed upon by the conference committee. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1786, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4749, 4766.
11 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (Supp. I1 1979). The PDA provides in relevant part:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not
limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related pur-
poses, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other
persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work ....
This subsection shall not require an employer to pay for health insurance
benefits for abortion, except where the life of the mother would be en-
dangered if the fetus were carried to term, or except where medical complica-
tions have arisen from an abortion: Provided, That nothing herein shall
preclude an employer from providing abortion benefits or otherwise affect
bargaining agreements in regard to abortion.
Id.
'" See H.R. REP. No. 948, supra note 151, at 3, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE. CONG. &
AD. NEws at 4751.
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tions with respect to any conditions of employment covered by TitleVH,
including hiring, reinstatement, termination and seniority. Further,
employers must provide disability, sick leave and medical benefits to
pregnant workers on the same basis as those provided to other workers
suffering from other conditions.'"
The attitudes manifested in Congress are encouraging. Whereas the
Supreme Court's position has evinced ignorance about the role of and
the burdens upon women in the labor force, Congress, by comparison,
appears to be a veritable fountain of enlightenment.155 Indeed, some
members of Congress demonstrated quite a sophisticated understanding
of the various interrelated factors which require the protection of preg-
nant workers. For example, Senator Williams, the leading Senate propo-
nent, pointed out how the potential of pregnancy tends to "marginalize"
women workers:
It is a shocking fact that, among full-time workers employed through-
out 1975, the median earnings of women were less than three-fifths of
the median earnings of men. Our Nation's working women earned only
59 cents for every dollar earned by working men. Women were re-
quired to work nearly 9 days to earn the same gross income that
men earn in only 5 days.
This legislation is also important because, in the long run, it will
permit the 36 million working American women to assume their right-
ful place, and make a full contribution in our Nation's economy. Too
often, sex discrimination has denied working women an opportunity
to pursue a career. One reason for the gap between the earnings of
men and women is that 90 percent of the entire female work force is
concentrated in 10 female occupations.
These shocking statistics cannot be made better unless working
women are provided effective protection against discrimination on
the basis of their childbearing capacity. [Evidence] has shown that
most policies and practices of discrimination against women in the
work force result from attitudes about pregnancy and the role of
women who become pregnant which are inconsistent with the full par-
ticipation of women in our economic system.
Because of their capacity to become pregnant, women have been
154 See id at 4-5, repiinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 4752-53.
Typical of the attitude expressed by many legislators was one statement made by
Senator Brooke:
The Gilbert decision could have a widespread effect upon our society and
our economy, for 46 percent of all women of working age are now in the labor
force. Thirty-five million women are working or seeking work. And 25 million
of these women are working because they must, either because they are the
sole support of their families or because their husbands earn less than $7,000 a
year.
123 CONG. REc. 7541 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Brooke). See also S. REP. No. 331, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 9 (1977); 123 CONG. REC. 7539 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Williams); id- at 29389-90




viewed as marginal workers not deserving the full benefits of com-
pensation and advancement granted to other workers."'
Such a broad view of the disadvantaged status of women would suggest
that Congress perceived a need for the most stringent sort of reform, a
scheme which would guarantee the support of pregnant persons. In-
deed, except for the provision that benefits need not extend to payment
for most abortions,157 the PDA purports to be an absolute prohibition of
pregnancy-related classifications. However, it is not clear just how far
the Congress actually intended the statute to go.
The Ambivalent Contours of the PDA
The Antidiscrimination Principle
If the legislative history of the PDA may be characterized by a single
theme, it is that the new section reaches no further than the "antidis-
crimination principle" allows.1 The PDA does not require employers to
pay any kind of pregnancy benefits if that employer has no benefits pro-
gram.159 Further, the congressional opponents emphasized that pregnant
123 CONG. REC. 29385 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Williams).
'5 See note 152 supra. A challenge was mounted to the Act's requirement that there be
coverage for complications arising from abortion and for abortions themselves when the
mother's life is endangered. The National Conference of Catholic Bishops and the United
States Catholic Conference, Inc., purporting to represent the class of all employers who
have moral, ethical or religious objections to abortion for any reason, sought a declaratory
judgment that the PDA violates their first amendment rights. The suit, however, was
dismissed as not being ripe. See National Conf. of Catholic Bishops v. Bell, 48 U.S.L.W.
2499 (D.D.C. Jan. 15, 1980), affid, No. 80-1283 (D.C. Cir. April 14, 1981).
I" Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHILOsOPHY & PUB. AFF. 107, 122
(1976). The antidiscrimination principle has been described by Professor Fiss as the
mediating principle which controls the interpretation of the equal protection clause. Fiss
argues that the emphasis on antidiscrimination, -as opposed to an emphasis on equality
itself, gives rise to the method of constitutional adjudication whereby only arbitrary or in-
vidious classifications are prohibited, and whereby permissibility of a classification is
measured by the degree of "fit" between its alleged purpose and the means chosen to
achieve that purpose. Id. at 109-11. Although the antidiscrimination principle is appealing
insofar as it allows for the appearance of individual justice and value-neutrality in decision-
making, it may be inadequate to deal with some claims of equality which deserve attention.
See id. at 129-46.
ISO It must be emphasized that this legislation ... prohibits only discriminatory
treatment. Therefore, it does not require employers to treat pregnant
employees in any particular manner with respect to hiring, permitting them to
continue working, providing sick leave, furnishing medical and hospital
benefits, providing disability benefits, or any other matter. H.R. 6075 in no
way requires the institution of any new programs where none currently exist.
The bill would simply require that pregnant women be treated the same as
other employees on the basis of their ability or inability to work.
H.R. REP. No. 948, supra note 151, at 4, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS_
1981]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
workers would be entitled to no special dispensations from any existing
benefits system. The Senate reported that:
benefits need to be paid only on the same terms applicable to other
employees-that is, generally, only when the employee is medically
unable to work. For example, if a pregnant woman wishes, for
reasons of her own, to stay home to prepare for childbirth, or, after
the child is born to care for the child, no disability or sick leave
benefits need be paid."u
A pregnant employee of an employer providing no benefits will suffer,
as will her co-employees who become sick or disabled. Further, even if
the pregnant woman is able to collect existing benefits, her income will
cease when she is medically able to work even if she has no choice but to
stay out of work to care for the infant herself.16' These circumstances,
although perhaps unfortunate, are consistent with the principle against
discriminatory treatment upon which Congress has apparently acted.
4752. A proponent in the Senate expressed the same view, explicitly comparing the PDA to
a state scheme not subject to the antidiscrimination principle.
The bill requires equal treatment when disability due to pregnancy is com-
pared to other disabling conditions. Although several State legislatures...
have chosen to address the problem of mandating certain types of benefits for
pregnant employees, S. 995 does not go that far. Instead, the bill adopts as its
standard equality of treatment, and thereby permits the personnel and fringe
benefit programs already in existence for other similar conditions to be the
measure of an employer's duty toward pregnant employees. It definitely does
not require a particular fringe benefits program; it does not require a certain
disability benefit level; it does not require an unlimited duration for the
benefit period; it does not require [the] employer to hire pregnant women.
123 CONG. REC. 29387 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Javits).
16 S. REP. No. 331, supra note 155, at 4.
'e Nonparental, nonschool child care is expensive and often difficult to find. In 1975, for
example, the average cost of day care per year per child was $1,017.12. Bane, Lein, O'Don-
nell, Stueve & Wells, Child-Care Arrangements of Working Parents, MONTHLY LAB. REV.,
Oct., 1979, at 53.
No more than 13 percent of children from birth to 2 years spent 30 hours a
week or more in the care of someone other than a parent. In fact, no more than
28 percent of the childreii in this age group spent even 10 hours a week in such
care-this despite the fact that 35 percent of mothers with children under 3
years worked or looked for work away from home.
Id. at 51. Only 8.8% of children ages 3 to 6 in 1975 whose mothers worked full-time were
cared for by their fathers. Id. Such statistics reveal the pressure put upon a mother to find
alternative child-care arrangements, or else to sacrifice her career. The Supreme Court has
recognized the difficulties of child-care faced by a single father in Weinburger v.
Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975). The appellee, Stephen Wiesenfeld, successfully challenged
the unavailability of Social Security survivors' benefits to surviving male spouses. "Ap-
pellee ... ascribed his employment difficulties in large part to the difficulties of child-care."
Id. at 641 n.7. A recent comparative study of policies toward working parents in the United
States, Sweden and China, demonstrated that all three countries suffer acute shortages of
child-care facilities. The governments of Sweden and China, however, have made a commit-
ment to provide a place for every child and are working to generate sufficient revenues for
that purpose while the United States government is still trying to decide whether it will
devote a serious effort to the child-care problem. C. ADAMS & K. WINSTON, MOTHERS AT
WORK 49 (1980). See also notes 340-43 & accompanying text infra.
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The implementation of the antidiscrimination principle appears to
coincide with Congress' substantive view of pregnancy. Congress, it
seems, has either refused to accept the idea that pregnancy is in any
way a unique condition, or, at least, has concluded that the law may not
take cognizance of any unique aspects of pregnancy. This view is most
apparent in the debate concerning the proposed Hatch amendment162
which provided for a six or eight week "cap" on any disability benefits
required to be paid pursuant to the PDA. Senator Hatch's argument
was that, since the proponents of the PDA agreed that disability due to
normal pregnancy averaged approximately six weeks, that limitation
should be incorporated into the statutory language. Such a limit would
promote a more compliant attitude among business persons who would
otherwise be reluctant to hire young females due to the substantial cost
of pregnancy inclusion and the alleged likelihood that one out of every
two new mothers would not return to work. The cap, he argued, would
particularly encourage compliance in those industries with a high
percentage of female employees. Last, he asserted that the cap on
pregnancy benefits was reasonable since disability due to pregnancy is
difficult to document.' Proponents of the PDA responded that to create
a cap for pregnancy would be to create a new kind of discrimination by
limiting pregnancy benefits even in programs with no caps on other
benefits. Especially in light of the fallacious nature of the "volun-
tariness" argument, there was no reason to treat pregnancy any dif-
ferently from any other disability.'" One senator stated:
I must oppose the selection of this one item on the ground that we
are doing the pregnant woman some kind of favor. The fact is what
we are doing, what we are dealing with here, is an actual disability
which is prejudicial to millions of women, and it is, therefore, a dis-
crimination which we should not accept.1M
The Hatch amendment was rejected in the Senate by a vote of 13-72.68
Thus, it appears that Congress acted from the premise that pregnancy
is not a special condition and not entitled to special treatment. However,
In Proposed Amendment No. 830 to S. 995, 123 CONG. REC. 29650 (1977).
' 123 CONG. REC. 29651 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Hatch). For example, Senator Hatch
stated:
What I have a problem with is really centering around the uncertainty that is
caused because of our failure to recognize this is not a disease ....
All I am trying to say is let us do this for the women of America. Let us do
it and let us do it even though we acknowledge it is not a disease, and let us do
it even though we do not have to because the Supreme Court has said we do
not have to do it, but let us do it because maybe it is right to do it, but let us
do it with reason.
Id. at 29655.
16 Id. at 29652-53 (remarks of Sen. Williams).
Id. at 29653 (remarks of Sen. Javits).
16 Id. at 29660.
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there are indications that Congress held this view only ambivalently,
and the failure to resolve the ambivalence may have an undermining ef-
fect on the impact of the PDA.
Preferential Treatment for Pregnancy Under the PDA
The wording of the PDA is ambiguous. In providing that women af-
fected by pregnancy "shall be treated the same for all employment-
related purposes" 1 7 as nonpregnant persons, the Congress allows for a
one-way interpretation: the statute by its terms mandates a standard of
treatment for pregnant workers, not for nonpregnant workers.'" The
"sameness" required by the statute would have the effect of increasing
some nonpregnancy-related benefits; the EEOC's Final Interpretive
Guidelines explicitly describe situations where such would be the
case."6 9 In other circumstances, however, the statute would result in
16 See note 152 supra.
66 The legislative history rarely addresses the possible "reverse discrimination" prob-
lem. The Senate report notes: "Employers who provide voluntary unpaid [maternity] leave
... may continue to do so, as long as it is done on a nondiscriminatory basis." S. REP. No.
331, supra note 155, at 4. This statement was made more than a year before passage of the
bill.
1!1 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10 (1979). The guidelines consist principally of 37 questions and
answers concerning the PDA. The questions and answers describing the effect of the PDA
on nonpregnancy-related benefits read:
29. Q. If an employer's insurance plan provides benefits after the
insured's employment has ended ... for costs connected with pregnancy and
delivery where conception occurred while the insured was working for the
employer, but not for costs of any other medical condition which began prior
to termination of employment, may an employer (a) continue to pay these ex-
tended benefits ... but not for other medical conditions, or (b) terminate these
benefits for pregnancy-related conditions?
A.... [E]xtended benefits must be provided for other medical conditions on
the same basis as for pregnancy-related medical conditions. Therefore, an
employer can neither continue to provide less benefits for other medical condi-
tions nor reduce benefits currently paid for pregnancy-related medical condi-
tions.
30. Q. Where an employer's health insurance plan currently requires total
disability as a prerequisite for payment of extended benefits for other medical
conditions but not for pregnancy-related costs, may the employer now require
total disability for payment of benefits for pregnancy-related medical condi-
tions as well?
A.... [E]xtended benefits cannot be reduced in order to come into com-
pliance with the Act .... Thus .... in order to comply with the Act, the
employer must treat other medical conditions as pregnancy-related conditions
are treated.
The Guidelines do not speak to the situation where sex-unique disabilities other than
pregnancy had been excluded from coverage prior to the passage of the PDA. The portions
of the Guidelines quoted above were challenged in Kansas Ass'n of Commerce & Indus. v.
EEOC, 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1343 (D. Kan. May 6, 1980), in part on the grounds that
they do not comport with congressional intent in that they penalize employers who have
voluntarily provided more generous benefits for pregnancy than for other conditions.
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preferential treatment for pregnancy. To provide disability benefits for
every condition except pregnancy clearly violates the statute; to pro-
vide disability benefits only for pregnancy may be permitted. It is, of
course, unlikely that an employer would provide a comprehensive preg-
nancy support scheme without providing other disability benefits. The
PDA does allow, however, and perhaps implicitly recognizes, that a
pregnancy support system could be different in kind from a disability
scheme.
It seems that if the exclusion of pregnancy from a benefits program
constitutes sex discrimination by congressional definition, the exclusion
of any sex-unique condition should constitute discrimination against that
sex to which the condition is unique. The PDA apparently would allow,
however, the continued existence of a plan which excluded other sex-
unique disabilities. If the employer's program only excludes prostatec-
tomies, no violation occurs; if it excludes pregnancy as well, there is a
violation, for pregnancy must be treated like any other disability
regardless of its uniqueness to one sex or the other. It is difficult to see
why the antidiscrimination principle requires anything more than
similar treatment of conditions to which the respective sexes are uni-
quely subject. Congress by going further has in a sense singled out
pregnancy for special treatment."'
Beyond the ambiguities raised by the actual wording of the pregnancy
amendment, Congress' ambivalence is apparent in its treatment of the
cost question. The Gilbert trial court held that even if there were a cost-
differential defense to a prima facie Title VII violation,171 such a defense
Unlike other challenges to the PDA, see, e.g., note 157 supra, this case was litigated on the
merits. See also Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 49 U.S.L.W. 2483
(E.D. Va. Jan. 26, 1981) (holding that Guideline's requirement that if employer provides
medical benefits for employees' spouses, he must include pregnancy benefits for male
employees' spouses equal to those provided to female employees is not authorized by Title
Vii).
I7 That some members of Congress are inclined to confer special treatment on pregnancy
is manifest in the legislative history of the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA). Throughout
the debates, proponents suggested that the ERA was not intended to prohibit gender-
specific classifications based on physical characteristics unique to one sex. See note 227 in-fra. A major purpose of allowing such classifications was to allow women to continue to col-
lect maternity benefits without, presumably, requiring parity in paternity benefits. See
note 227 infra.
17 Neither Congress nor the courts have recognized such a defense. Los Angeles Dep't of
Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 716-17 (1978). Cost, however, may be relevant to,
though not determinative of, the business necessity defense available only upon a showing
of a disproportionate impact resulting from a neutral policy. See Robinson v. Lorillard
Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 799 n.8 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971); cf. Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 689-90 (1973) (suggesting that, while mere administrative conven-
ience is no defense to sex discrimination challenge under equal protection clause, govern-
ment could prevail if it proves that gender classification results in actual cost savings). It is




should not be available in Gilbert due to the "[i]nherent disabilities
deriving from pregnancy susceptibility . . It is not clear that this
single exception to a differential compensation defense is not within the
congressional intent which Title VII embodies."'' 7 Even now that Con-
gress has specifically considered the costs of prohibiting pregnancy
discrimination, the intent of that body regarding the cost issue remains
unclear.
The most vehement witnesses during hearings on the PDA argued
that cost was not only irrelevant, but also a smokescreen: "The cost
argument is an attempt to find an acceptable and neutral explanation
for an exclusion rooted in unacceptable stereotypes and assumptions."'"
Some congressional proponents took a similar posture, stating: "[Price]...
basically is a non-issue."'74 The Senate Report, while admitting that an
accurate estimate of the cost was impracticable, unequivocally states
that "even a very high cost could not justify continuation of the policy of
discrimination against pregnant women which has played such a major
part in the pattern of sex discrimination in this country."'75 Such state-
ments appear, however, only in the early legislative history of the bill;
later history emphasizes the nonprohibitive nature of the estimated
cost.7" The bulk of the legislative record is comprised of cost data, with
estimates differing by more than four hundred percent;1 7 the record is
replete with a number of disclaimers, however, to the effect that the
real costs of nondiscriminatory disability benefits or medical insurance
or both are inestimable. 78 Thus, it is apparent that no agreement was
reached in Congress on what the cost of the PDA would be, nor on the
principle that the cost should be irrelevant.
Cost is far from a dead issue. Any estimate of costs is irrelevant to
the individual employer, since his outlay will be contingent on many
variables, including, perhaps most significantly, the composition of his
work force. Indeed, this was pointed out in congressional hearings by
proponents and opponents alike.79 Occupationally segregated industries,
such as insurance, banking and retail merchandizing, will bear a greater
7 375 F. Supp. at 383.
17 House Hearings, supra note 3, at 46 (statement of Wendy W. Williams). See also Dis-
crimination on the Basis of Pregnancy: Hearings on S. 995 Before the Subcomm. on Labor
of the Senate Comm. on Human Resources, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1977) [hereinafter cited
as Senate Hearings] (statement of Ethel B. Walsh).
..4 Senate Hearings, supra note 173, at 24 (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
175 S. REP. No. 331, supra note 155, at 10-11.
"' See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 948, supra note 151, at 10.
17 See id. at 9.
' See, e.g., id. at 9-10.
" See, e.g., House Hearings, supra note 3, at 24-25 (statement of Wendy W. Williams);
id. at 254-55 (statement of Nat'l Retail Merchants Ass'n).
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cost burden." Though we may applaud any intrusion which serves to
jolt those who exploit "women's work," trouble lies ahead. Congress failed
to grapple with the disproportionate burden on those employers, and it
is highly unlikely that they will relinquish the spoils of occupational
segregation without a battle. By failing either to say that cost was no
object or to state how much would be too much to pay, Congress has in-
vited challenges based on prohibitive cost with which the Supreme
Court may be most sympathetic.'81
Further, Congress did not firmly address or repudiate the Gilbert
Court's "inclusion focused analysis."'82 If the effect of the PDA is
uniformly or substantially to give women as a group a greater propor-
tionate share of employment benefits than men as a group, a challenge
on that basis is inevitable. In this regard, it must be noted that the
Court in Los Angeles Department of Water & Power v. Manhart,'3 re-
jecting the calculation of individual contributions to a pension plan based
on actuarial probabilities, claimed not to be overruling or cutting back
on Gilbert.'" There is thus an open question as to when actuarial data
and calculations of benefits accruing to a group qua group are relevant
to a determination of individual rights.
Two other facts must be considered when evaluating the congres-
sional treatment of pregnancy costs. First, as Congress acknowledged,
eighty percent of American women become pregnant during their work-
ing lives.' Second, a relatively high percentage of pregnant women do
not return to their jobs. 8 ' Congress referred to the "stereotype that all
women are marginal workers" as a target to be eliminated by the
amendment;18 7 in so doing, however, Congress did not address these
facts which are the basis for the stereotype. Surely, the relationship be-
tween pregnancy and marginal status is one for which employers are
' See Summary of Company Responses to Questionnaire Regarding H.R. 5055, H.R.
6075, and S. 995, reprinted in 123 CONG. REC. 29651 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Summary of
Responses].
"' See Kansas Ass'n of Commerce & Indus. v. EEOC, 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1343 (D.
Kan. May 6, 1980). Plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that the EEOC guidelines, see note 169
supra, which require that all pregnancy and benefits unrelated to pregnancy be brought in-
to parity and that pregnancy-related benefits extend to the spouses of male employees, are
beyond the intent of Congress and constitute a taking of property without just compensa-
tion. 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1343. See also note 169 supra.
88 See note 49 & accompanying text supra.
435 U.S. 702 (1978).
18 Id at 714-16.
1,3 123 CONG. REC. 29385 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Williams).
8 See House Hearings, supra note 3, at 257 (statement of Nat'l Retail Merchants Ass'n);
Summary of Responses, supra note 180.
"7 H.R. REP. No. 948, supra note 151, at 6, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 4754.
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largely to blame; Congress heard testimony to this effect."M The
phenomenon of the marginality of women workers must be recognized
and realistically addressed. In failing to account for the reality of
marginality, Congress has made its cost determinations even less con-
vincing and has rendered the PDA more vulnerable. This is all to say
that Congress has taken a less than courageous stand about what it was
doing. The PDA will increase costs to employers by an amount which
may be substantial. It is likely that women as a group will enjoy a
disproportionate share of some employment benefits. Employers will
probably suffer some losses by virtue of benefits paid to women who do
not return to the work force. If Congress intended to permit these ef-
fects, as it apparently did, it was misleading to phrase the rhetoric in
terms of the antidiscrimination principle.
Congress alone has the power to enact sweeping social policy; with
such authority, the Congress could have chosen to elucidate the place of
childbearing in society. Instead, the Congress reacted to the Gilbert
decision without thinking through the issue of what pregnancy is and
how it should be treated. If pregnancy is not unique, the PDA is super-
ficially appropriate, but the issues of preferential treatment and cost are
left dangerously open. If pregnancy is unique, some provision must be
made for "women's biologically more burdensome place in the scheme of
human existence." '89 The Congress has failed to clarify the policy of this
nation toward pregnancy.
A Possible Unconstitutional Application of the PDA
The confrontation between the Court and Congress" which resulted
in the enactment of the PDA may produce litigation which not only will
provide an opportunity to observe the Supreme Court's present attitude
toward childbearing but could also clarify two of the most difficult deci-
sions of recent times, National League of Cities v. Usery"9' and Katzen-
bach v. Morgan.92 A state or political subdivision of a state could
"U See, e.g., House Hearings, supra note 3, at 211 (statement of Laurence Gold) (because
workers are excluded from benefits, "it is little wonder that they do not display that loyalty"
which would motivate them to excel in or return to the workforce).
375 F. Supp. at 383. See notes 322-52 & accompanying text infra.
"' The confrontational nature of events leading up to the enactment of the PDA is evi-
denced by comments of some Congressmen. See, e.g., 124 CONG. REC. H6,868 (daily ed. July
18, 1978) (remarks of Rep. LaFalce) ("This bill is a necessary measure to counteract recent
Supreme Court decisions that have endorsed sex discriminations in employers' insurance
programs."); 123 CONG. REC. 7540 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Williams) ("[Working women] are
hopeful that the Congress will take prompt action to restore the basic rights the Supreme
Court has infringed upon.").
"1 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
I 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
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challenge the new section on the ground that the Congress had neither
commerce clause13 power nor power under the enforcement clause of
the fourteenth amendment194 to obligate the state or subdivision to pro-
vide pregnancy benefits to its employees.
Congress may have transgressed an affirmative limitation on its com-
merce clause power as interpreted by National League of Cities. That
decision found that the 1974 amendments to'the Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA),95 which purported to extend minimum wage and hour pro-
visions to most employees of states and their subdivisions, impermissi-
bly infringed upon the states' sovereign functions protected by the
tenth amendment. That constitutional provision precludes an impair-
ment by Congress of the "functions essential to [the] separate and in-
dependent existence" of the states. 9 ' The sovereignty of the states
would be threatened due to the costs and attendant sacrifices imposed
upon them by the FLSA amendments'" and due to the displacement by
the statute of the states' ability to make "fundamental employment deci-
sions" affecting the manner in which essential services are rendered to
citizens.198 Thus, if a state or subdivision could demonstrate a high cost
imposed by the PDA and could portray fringe benefits arrangements as
essential to employer-employee relations, National League of Cities may
require the conclusion that Congress lacked commerce clause authority
to make the Act effective against the states.
On the other hand, a number of federal courts have read National
League of Cities narrowly in upholding under the commerce clause the
application of the Equal Pay Act1 which forbids sex discrimination in
wages to states and their subdivisions.' These decisions have held that
National League of Cities should be confined to the context of minimum
wages and maximum hours, and that the ability to pay unequal wages
solely on the basis of sex cannot be considered a sovereign function
'"U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.19 Id. amend. XIV, § 5.
'"Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, 88 Stat. 1245 (1974).
,N 426 U.S. at 845.
"Id. at 846.
Id. at 847-51.
'n 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976).
See, e.g., Marshall v. A & M Consol. Indep. School Dist., 605 F.2d 186 (5th Cir. 1979);
Pearce v. Wichita County, 590 F.2d 128 (5th Cir. 1979); Marshall v. City of Sheboygan, 577
F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1978); Usery v. Bettendorf Community School Dist., 423 F. Supp. 637 (S.D.
Iowa 1976); Christensen v. Iowa, 417 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Iowa 1976). See also Ruffin v. County
of Los Angeles, 607 F.2d 1276, 1282 n.3 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 951 (1980).
Decisions upholding the Equal Pay Act under the commerce clause rationale described
above, as well as under § 5 of the fourteenth amendment, are Nilsen v. Metropolitan Fair &
Exposition Auth., 435 F. Supp. 1159 (N.D. Ill. 1977); Usery v. Edward J. Meyer Memorial
Hosp., 428 F. Supp. 1368 (W.D.N.Y. 1977); Brown v. County of Santa Barbara, 427 F. Supp.
112 (C.D. Cal. 1977); Usery v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 421 F. Supp. 111 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
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necessary to the states' separate and independent existence. As one
district court colorfully put it: "The argument that the decision to
discriminate in pay on the basis of sex is an essential or integral State
function is both asinine and an affront to human dignity." ''
These decisions serve as authority for the application of the PDA to
the states and their subdivisions unless the states prevail on an argu-
ment that pregnancy benefits are quite unlike the equal pay for equal
work which the Equal Pay Act requires: the former may be more costly,
and, rather than equalizing benefits for men and women, may require
giving women a disproportionate share of benefits.2 Thus, to allow
pregnancy benefits would be discriminatory rather than vice versa.
Even if the PDA could not be applied to states pursuant to the com-
merce power, however, the National League of Cities Court expressly
declined to comment on congressional power vis A vis the states under
section 5 of the fourteenth amendment.0 3 Moreover, just four days after
National League of Cities, the Court held in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer.4 that,
the eleventh amendment notwithstan ding, a Title VII backpay award
could be imposed against a state because Congress in enacting Title VII
was legislating pursuant to section 5.
[W]e think that the Eleventh Amendment, and the principle of state
sovereignty which it embodies ... are necessarily limited by the en-
forcement provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. In that
section Congress is expressly granted authority to enforce "by ap-
propriate legislation" the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which themselves embody significant limitations on
state authority .... We think Congress may, in determining what is
"appropriate legislation" for the purpose of enforcing the provisions -
of the Fourteenth Amendment, provide for private suits against
States or state officials which are constitutionally impermissible in
other contexts."5
' Brown v. County of Santa Barbara, 427 F. Supp. 112, 113 (C.D. Cal. 1977).
See notes 142-49 & accompanying text supra.
426 U.S. at 852 n.17. The relevant provisions of the fourteenth amendment are:
SECTION ONE: .... No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges and immunities of the citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of the laws.
SECTION FIVE: The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of the article.
427 U.S. 445 (1976).
.. Id at 456 (citation omitted). It is of no present relevance that Fitzpatrick construed
the eleventh amendment. Cf Nilsen v. Metropolitan Fair & Exposition Auth., 435 F. Supp.




Though Fitzpatrick is taken as a powerful vindication of all provisions
of Title VII, its importance for the PDA may be diminished. That is, the
issue in Fitzpatrick was sex discrimination against male employees of a
state with regard to available fringe benefits, a challenge which clearly
would have been cognizable under section 1 of the fourteenth amend-
ment as dissimilar treatment of persons similarly situated."8 However,
an attempt to compel a state to pay pregnancy benefits in our hypotheti-
cal case could not be brought as a sex discrimination claim under the
equal protection clause due to the holding in Geduldig. As a pregnancy
discrimination case, the claim would receive the same low level of
scrutiny applied in Geduldig, and hence would fail. Thus, the question
arises, can Congress achieve by legislation enacted pursuant to section 5
that which could not be achieved by litigation pursuant to section 1?
The Seventh Circuit in Bond v. Stanton... recently answered in no
uncertain terms: "In exercising these enforcement powers under § 5,
Congress is not limited to remedying inequalities which the courts
would determine to be violative of the Constitution. It may prohibit con-
duct which would not otherwise be unlawful, in order to secure the
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment." 8
The Seventh Circuit's position thus expressed is consistent with that
of the plurality in Katzenbach v. Morgan."9 However, the successful im-
plementation of the PDA against the states is still not assured. Bond
upheld as constitutional a statute providing for attorney's fees in civil
rights cases.21 Soon thereafter, the Supreme Court did the same in
another case." ' Therefore, the Bond context is unlike the pregnancy one
in which implementation of the statute faces a Supreme Court decision
condoning pregnancy discrimination: although the courts need not have
determined yet that conduct is unconstitutional in order for Congress to
prohibit it, it is not necessarily true that Congress may prohibit conduct
which the Supreme Court has expressly held constitutional. Admittedly,
the latter was the situation in Katzenbach, the Supreme Court having
previously upheld in Lassiter v. Northampton Bd. of Elections21 the con-
stitutionality of English literacy requirements for voting which were
See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
5" 55 F.2d 172 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 916 (1978).
555 F.2d at 174-75.
384 U.S. 641 (1966). The plurality expressly declined to consider whether the equal
protection clause would nullify the requirement that voters be able to read as applied, and
considered instead the issue of whether Congress had enacted "appropriate legislation"
within the meaning of § 5. Id. at 649. In sustaining the enactment, the plurality expressly
stated that Congress could act in the absence of prior judicial determination. Id. at 648-49.
"o 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976).
" Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
360 U.S. 45 (1959).
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subsequently prohibited by the statute at issue in Katzenbach.2 1
Nonetheless, it remains true that a majority of the Supreme Court has
not yet held that its decisions may be effectively overruled by Congress'
actions under its section 5 authority. Moreover, the Court's decision in
Oregon v. Mitchell"4 gives reason to consider that the Katzenbach
plurality opinion is no longer as robust as it once appeared.
The issue presented by the PDA is in some respects analogous to that
presented by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) 5 In
Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia"' the Court upheld, using
the rational basis test, a state statute mandating retirement of police of-
ficers at age fifty. The use of the rational basis test was chosen because
government employment is not a fundamental right and age is not a
suspect classification."7 Thus, Congress has acted under section 5 to pro-
vide vigorous coverage for the aged while the Supreme Court has ex-
tended only minimal equal protection. A federal district court has com-
mented on this discrepancy. In sustaining under section 5 the ADEA as
applied to the states, the court stated in Aaron v. Davis:"8
The Court's decision in Massachusetts Board of Retirement ... is
not to the contrary. In that case, the Court did not address the ques-
tion of the [ADEA], but held only that the Fourteenth Amendment,
without any enforcing legislation, did not bar a state law requiring
mandatory retirement for some state employees at age 50 since such
a law, when tested under the rational basis standard, was not unrea-
sonable in view of the fact that physical fitness generally declines
with age. It is well settled that legislation authorized by section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment can prohibit practices which might pass
muster under the Equal Protection Clause, absent an Act of Con-
gress.
219
As in the age discrimination context, the PDA may be construed only
to enforce the rational basis protection already applied in Geduldig.
Two aspects, however, distinguish the PDA from the ADEA. First, its
constitutionality under section 5 may be more likely to reach full review
213 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(e) (1976).
"1 400 U.S. 112 (1970). This case held that Congress' attempt to lower the voting age in
state elections to 18, see Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, §§
301-302, 84 Stat. 314 (1970), was unconstitutional. Although the majority rationale in Mit-
chell, insofar as it may cut back on Katzenbach, is less than clear, it is at least susceptible
to the interpretation that Congress is powerless to legislate under § 5 unless invidious
discrimination of a sort cognizable by a court is its target. See 400 U.S. at 295-96 (Stewart,
J., concurring & dissenting in part).
,,5 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (Supp. I 1979).
1 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
.. Id. at 313.
.12 424 F. Supp. 1238 (E.D. Ark. 1976). The court also sustained the ADEA under the com-
merce clause, holding that prohibiting dissimilar treatment of older employees would not
"significantly interfere with the policy choices" of the state with regard to its primary func-
tions. Id. at 1241; accord, Usery v. Board of Educ., 421 F. Supp. 718 (D. Utah 1976).
2"9 424 F. Supp. at 1241 n.2 (citation omitted).
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by the Supreme Court insofar as it is not sustainable under the com-
merce clause.' Second, it presents a special problem because of the
PDA's definitional character. Congress did not create a separate
substantive protection for pregnancy as it did for age; instead, it said
that pregnancy discrimination is sex discrimination. The vulnerability
thus arises from the definitional disagreement: if the Congress can say
pregnancy discrimination is sex discrimination, in spite of heavy
authority to the contrary, could the Congress have equated pregnancy
discrimination with race or alienage discrimination for Title VII pur-
poses? Absurdly, such inquiry into the rationality of congressional ac-
tion might arise.
While these concerns may be the result of overreaction, when dealing
with the Supreme Court's perception of pregnancy, there is reason for
apprehension. It is the Justices of the Supreme Court, not the aca-
demics, who have rendered the law relating to pregnancy peculiar, and
who are responsible for any peculiarities in other areas of law resulting
from having been litigated in the pregnancy context. The Supreme
Court's treatment of pregnancy compels the conclusion that the PDA is
to be far-reaching and different from anything else the Congress has at-
tempted to do. Those who applaud the congressional urge to wipe out
discrimination in every guise should hope that the limits of those con-
gressional powers will not be seriously tested in a pregnancy case.
Because of the danger of successful challenge to the congressional solu-
tion, Congress has failed to deal adequately with the pregnancy dilemma
through Title VII. Surprisingly, the Equal Rights Amendment also fails
to resolve the pregnancy dilemma and in fact, has little impact on the
pregnancy benefits issue.
THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT
During his Senate confirmation hearings, Justice Stevens suggested
that the effect of the proposed Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) would
be largely symbolic, for the reason that women are already protected
against discrimination by the fourteenth amendment. 1 Of course, the
argument that women should rely on the fourteenth amendment (and
thus avoid cluttering the Constitution with redundancies) has been often
made and often rebutted.' Justice Stevens' comment, however, coming
as it does from a reliable source, suggests two perspectives on the ERA
See notes 195-202 & accompanying text supra.
at Hearings on the Nomination of John Paul Stevens Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1975).
Compare Freund, The Equal Rights Amendment Is Not the Way, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 234 (1971), with Ginsburg, supra note 80.
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which give pause in the pregnancy context. Either, one may argue,
there is something inherent in the proposed amendment restricting its
possible coverage in ways similar to the limitations of the fourteenth
amendment, or the ERA, regardless of its abstract potential, will have
only as broad an interpretation as the Supreme Court, already em-
powered by the fourteenth amendment to protect the rights of women,
will choose to give it. Each of these notions, when applied to the issue of
pregnancy, should dissuade one from blind faith in the transformative
power of the proposed twenty-seventh amendment.
First, what did Congress intend the scope of the ERA to be? The
legislative history of the amendment, which is liberally threaded with
the classic analysis of Brown, Emerson, Falk and Freedman," shows
congressional awareness of the danger of compromise. All language con-
cerning privacy, protective legislation or exclusion of women from com-
pulsory military service was fortunately kept out of the text' as a
result of the view that "'equality' can only be soiled by qualification."'
The ERA is inspired by a principle of "absolute" equality which for-
bids any classification based on gender. The legislative history,
however, admits to important exceptions in the amendment's coverage,
which, if adopted by the Supreme Court for purposes of interpretation,M
could lead to consequences wholly irreconcilable with the vision that ap-
parently animated the 92d Congress. The suggested exception which
portends ill with regard to pregnancy is one which allows reasonable
classifications based on physical characteristics unique to one sex:M
' Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment. A Constitutional
Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871 (1971).
n' The House rejected an amendment exempting women from compulsory military ser-
vice, approving the resolution in its original form. See 117 CONG. REC. 35813 (1971). The text
finally proposed by Congress reads:
Section 1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States or by any State on account of sex.
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.
Section 3. This amendment shall take effect two years after the date of
ratification.
H.R. REP. No. 359, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1971) (separate views of 14 members).
For the argument that the Court should give great weight to the intent of Congress in
interpreting the ERA, see Comment, Congressional Intent and the ERA: A Proposed New
Analysis, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 637 (1979). That comment illustrates that most of the so-called
"exceptions" seem to have been generated as strategies for passage in response to a parade
of "horribles" asserted by opponents. Some of the specific evils thought to be allowed by
the ERA were ridiculous and elicited less than judicious responses from proponents. For
example, the leading proponent in the Senate, Senator Bayh, was put in the position of
assuring the leading opponent, Senator Ervin, that the ERA would not invalidate any law
prohibiting the use of obscene language with female telephone operators. See 118 CONG.
REC. 9531 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Ervin); id. at 9536 (remarks of Sen. Bayh). Such a law ar-
bitrarily affecting one gender is unquestionably impermissible under the ERA.
The unique physical characteristics exception appears throughout the legislative
history. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 359, supra note 225; Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman,
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"[T/he original resolution does not require that women must be treated
in all respects the same as men. 'Equality' does not mean 'sameness.' "'
As an example of a permitted classification on the basis of the unique
physical characteristics exception, the fourteen members of Congress
arguing for this exception offered a hypothetical law providing maternity
benefits to women. The irony of this illustration did not become
evident until the Geduldig v. Aiellom decision in 1974.
Nothing in the legislative history of the ERA suggests that Congress
anticipated the dilemma posed by Geduldig and the cases following it.
The Congress seems to have been most concerned with allowing for the
preservation not only of such maternity benefits but also of forcible
rape laws. 1 These concerns, it may be argued, show that Congress saw
the unique physical characteristics exception as applying to laws genu-
inely beneficial to or protective of women. Especially considering the
diligence Congress showed in avoiding compromise in the wording of
the amendment, the Congress could not have meant the exception to
permit invidious discrimination of the sort at issue in the Geduldig
situation. "The tragedy is that no one bothered to say-so.""2 Therefore,
the question of the effect of the ERA in the pregnancy/disability context
moves to the second issue suggested by Justice Stevens: the scope of in-
terpretation by the Supreme Court.
Geduldig and its progeny paint a grim picture for the ERA. What the
Court did in Geduldig was essentially to articulate just such a unique
physical characteristics exception to the doctrine of equal treatment.
Footnote 20 of that case,' referring to lawmakers' freedom to include
or exclude pregnancy within the coverage of an insurance program,
could translate in the post-ERA world into lawmakers' freedom to
classify according to unique physical characteristics. Strictly speaking,
this is not exactly the case, as, under the equal protection rationale of
Geduldig, the Supreme Court found no classification on the basis of sex
from the prohibition of which there could be an exception on the basis of
supra note 223, at 893-96. The other exception which causes concern is that based on
"privacy." See H.R. REP. No. 359, supra note 225, at 7; Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman,
supra note 223, at 899. Though the privacy exception does not directly support the result in
the pregnancy cases, it may have pernicious effects in that realm insofar as the exception is
directly geared to reinforcing those social arrangements such as marriage, home and family
life that buttress the present institution of pregnancy. See notes 253-352 & accompanying
text infra. Indeed, it may be argued that the privacy exception, carrying with it the threat
of a "community moral standards" test, is at once an important strategy for ratification and
a means by which the amendment could be rendered toothless.
m' H.R. REP. No. 359, supra note 225, at 7.
=9 Id.
= 417 U.S. 484 (1974). See generally text accompanying notes 11-28 supra.
21 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 689, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1972).
= Comment, supra note 39, at 475.
417 U.S. at 496 n.20.
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a unique physical characteristic. But the convolutions of the constitu-
tional argument are distracting. There is this similarity between the
unique physical characteristics exception and the Geduldig approach,
and it appears that the ERA would support the Geduldig result.' The
unique physical characteristics exception and the Geduldig distinction
share a logical absurdity: to be a member of a sex is to have the unique
physical characteristics of that sex. Absent discrimination on the basis of
unique characteristics there would be no such thing as sex discrimina-
tion. Absent analysis of what the unique characteristics ideally should
mean, there is no stopping place to the legal mistreatment of women.
Some have argued that this apparent crack in the coverage of the
ERA will be patched by the more searching standard of review which
the ERA entails. This ubiquitous argument has been advanced by cer-
tain commentators who state that the principle underlying the ERA is
"that the law must deal with particular attributes of individuals, not
with a classification based on the broad and impermissible attribute of
sex." It is this principle of individual treatment which yields what has
been called the "subsidiary principle" of the permissibility of laws
classifying according to unique physical characteristics: "[S]o long as the
law deals only with a characteristic found in all (or some) women but no
men, or in all (or some) men but no women, it does not ignore individual
characteristics found in both sexes in favor of an average based on
sex."m These commentators acknowledge that the danger inherent in
the subsidiary principle is that it re-introduces into the scheme of ab-
solute equality the dual system of rights which characterizes the
historical and current legal situation. They argue that the realm of
dualism, however, is extremely limited in that it only applies to "situa-
tions where the regulation is closely, directly and narrowly confined to
the unique physical characteristic." 7 A court could determine whether
such a law is a subterfuge for sex discrimination by a method closely
akin to that now recognized as strict scrutiny.' Six factors have been
identified as relevant to such a decision: the proportion of women, or
' Indeed, the State of California cited the legislative history of the unique physical
characteristics exception in support of its argument that the pregnancy exclusion should
not be held to be sexually discriminatory. See Brief for Appellants at 22-44, Geduldig v.
Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974). Arguably, the unique physical characteristics doctrine does not
support the Geduldig result on the ground that the pregnancy exclusion irrationally serves
the purpose of protecting workers who must be absent from work. Whether or not this
argument, rejected in Geduldig, would prevail in the ERA context depends largely on
whether the Court is open to a more sophisticated explanation of costs. See notes 24-26,
94-107 & accompanying text supra.
Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, supra note 223, at 889.
Id. at 893.
Id at 894.




men, who actually have the characteristic in question; the relationship
between the characteristic and "the problem" (the purpose of the
legislation); the proportion of the problem attributable to the unique
physical characteristic of women, or men; the portion of the problem
eliminated by the solution; the availability of less drastic alternatives;
and the importance of the problem ostensibly being solved as compared
with the costs of the least drastic solution. It is then asserted that how
the courts would balance each of these factors is hard to predict, but
that nonetheless, "all of these considerations are of the kind that courts
constantly deal with in similar cases where reliance upon a legitimate
factor is used to achieve illegitimate ends." 9 Thus, the prospect for
limiting the unique physical characteristics exception is expressly
reliant on a favorable inclination of the courts.
It is not within the scope of this article to analyze all the doctrinal dif-
ficulties inherent in this six-factor approach, " ' nor even to demonstrate
its specific inadequacy as applied to a Geduldig situation."1 Suffice it to
say that, whatever the good intentions of Congress or the symbolic im-
portance of the ERA, nothing in the amendment itself nor in its legisla-
tive history mandates that the Supreme Court limit or refuse to apply
the unique physical characteristics exception in a pregnancy disabil-
ity/sick leave case. If this is so, why not just dispense with the unique
physical characteristics exception to the ERA? It may be argued that it
is an important strategy for ratification. However, in debates over the
ERA, this exception is rarely mentioned by proponents, and if mentioned,
rarely effective. The latter is true for two reasons. First, it is difficult to
explain why the unique physical characteristics doctrine is there or how
it should work. Second, it is irrelevant to the argument which has sur-
passed "unisex bathrooms"2" as the opponents' favorite: the proposed
registration of young women for possible military service."'
Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, supra note 223, at 895-96.
Generally, the approach has no meaning unless we can better inform the concept of
the "problem" addressed by gender-specific legislation. As Professor Goldberg-Ambrose
has asked, what, for example, is the problem addressed by forcible rape laws? Is it the
prevention of forcible sexual intrusion or is it the prevention of impregnation? If the se-
cond, then a less drastic alternative would be to punish severely only when there is ejacula-
tion or impregnation, which ignores the intent requirement of our criminal law. If the first,
then the humiliation arising from forcible intrusion would be arguably as great in rapes of
men or women by women, and the law would fail under the ERA. Class discussion in
Women and the Law, Harvard Law School (Oct. 12, 1977).
4 See Peratis & Rindskopf, supra note 39, at 31.
242 The privacy exception is more effective against the "unisex bathroom" argument. This
exception is also frequently mentioned because it has an independent constitutional basis
which can be articulated.
2 In ERA debates, proponents seldom offer any arguments for the justice of including
women in a threatened draft, thus forfeiting an opportunity to expose the insidiousness of
the opponents' posture. If the opponent is a pacifist, her goals can be better achieved by giving
all Americans a personal stake in resistance; if the opponent is a warmonger, she should go.
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Furthermore, the purposes of the unique physical characteristics ex-
ception can be achieved through other means. We have seen that, al-
though the exception would preserve maternity benefits, it would also
preserve Geduldig v. Aiello. Maternity benefits can be justified and
Geduldig ultimately condemned without resort to such an exception by
a more fundamental inquiry into the nature and status of pregnancy. "
In addition, it is possible to postulate classifications which would be used
in situations where legislators have traditionally used gender as short-
hand, but where unique physical characteristics are actually irrelevant.
These are "functional classifications" by which a legislature could, for
example, provide state employees with :'childrearing leave" rather than
"post-maternity leave" much to the benefit of society at large.2"5 There
could be any number of such functional, sex-neutral classifications based
on need, education, training, experience, skills or other measurable
traits. This approach could easily be used in place of the dangerous
unique physical characteristics exception. After all, laws relating to wet
nurses and sperm donors, for example, which would be specific can-
didates for unique physical characteristics insulation,24 6 could easily be
sex-neutralized since significant unique physical characteristics are
already operable functional characteristics. By rejecting the physical
characteristics doctrine, a dual system of rights defined in sexual terms,
which arguably reinforces an inimical overawareness of the separation
of the sexes, could be avoided.
The problem with any functional classification is that such a scheme
may fall more detrimentally on one sex than the other.247 One example is
a sex-neutral law prohibiting adults with primary child-care responsibility
from having certain kinds of employment. 8 It has been suggested that
in such a situation, a court should respond "by looking beyond the adop-
tion of the 'neutral' classification into the realities of purpose, practical
operation, and effect." 9 Such an approach would bring to the ERA con-
text a system of review analogous to the disproportionate impact doc-
The "women's-privilege-to-stay-home" argument must be shown to have its roots in the
most pernicious sort of stereotype, and the only way to demonstrate this is through ab-
solute candor. The Supreme Court addressed these difficult questions during the October
1980 Term in Rostker v. Goldberg, 101 S. Ct. 2646 (1981). The lower court had found the
male exclusive draft unconstitutional. 509 F. Supp. 586 (E.D. Pa. 1980). The Supreme Court
reversed, reasoning that Congress acted within its broad constitutional authority over
military affairs. 101 S. Ct. at 2660.
See notes 253-352 & accompanying text infra.Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, supra note 223, at 897-99.
2.. Id at 893.
" See id at 897.




trine of Title VII. ° There is a major drawback to this suggestion,
however. It is true that if the ERA requires, perhaps artificially, sex-
specific classifications to be expressed neutrally, there is an urgent
need for a means of monitoring the real-world effects of those classifica-
tions. However, given the wording of the ERA, l it may also be true
that it is subject to the concerns regarding the fourteenth amendment
expressed in Washington v. Davis,2 requiring proof of discriminatory
intent to sustain the constitutional challenge. Moreover, even if the in-
tent requirement were not adopted in the ERA context, success under
the disproportionate impact doctrine is not assured. Even given the
clearest indication of congressional authority in Title VII, section
703(a)(2) to look into the actual effects of allegedly sex-neutral classifica-
tions, the Court in Gilbert found no violation of Title VII though one
hundred percent of the burden from the classification in question fell on
women. In light of this indifference to congressional mandate, it is not
necessarily true that an amendment importing a similar scheme of
review would yield a different result. What the Court is empowered to
do bears no necessary relation to outcome.
It should be pointed out, however, that the Davis problem would be
applicable to all functional classifications, not just to those which should
be transformed from nonneutral classifications based on the unique
physical characteristics exception. Indeed, those classifications would
either create no adverse disproportionate impact, such as in the case of
sperm donors, or would be easy to unmask as pretext, such as a law pro-
hibiting all persons ever capable of bearing children from holding public
office. The inability to prove a constitutional challenge to a "neutral"
classification without proving intent is a burden borne in all discrimina-
tion law contexts. The unique physical characteristics exception does
nothing to alleviate the Washington v. Davis problem, and otherwise
the exception legitimizes the most pernicious view of women in their
procreative capacities.
This article has argued that the exception be eliminated, and has fur-
ther suggested that other avenues must be taken to achieve one of the
major congressional purposes behind the exception: the preservation of
maternity benefits. It is the thesis of this article that the apparent
choice that women must make between benefits and burdens with re-
gard to pregnancy is a constitutional hoax. The real issue rests not on
the limits of present constitutional law doctrines, but rather on the
See notes 30-34 & accompanying text supra. See also Peratis & Rindskopf, supra note
39, at 32 (suggesting incorporation of Title VII disproportionate impact analysis into ERA).
" See note 224 supra.
=' 426 U.S. 229 (1976). See text accompanying note 34 supra.
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substantive problem of pregnancy itself. This discussion of the ERA
simply illustrates that the amendment and the analytical approach cur-
rently taken toward it cannot meet the real challenge of the problem of
childbearing.
TOWARDS A FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE
Thus far, this article has highlighted the biased judicial attitudes
toward women, and particularly pregnant women, which inform the Su-
preme Court's pregnancy decisions. These decisions isolate pregnancy
and endorse the mutual exclusivity of the statuses of motherhood and
citizenship. Furthermore, the Court fails to accommodate the realities of
the situations of working mothers when, for example, in Nashville Gas
Co. v. Satty,1 it distinguishes between a loss of seniority and "merely a
loss of income."' ,
Likewise, Congress has failed to respond adequately to the sex-unique
aspects of childbearing and breastfeeding through Title VII. The ambiva-
lent nature of the PDA has not distinguished the more burdensome posi-
tion of pregnant women in society and, as a result, the preferential
treatment and increased costs aspects of the amendment leave it dan-
gerously open to challenge. Only a congressional proposal which ac-
counts for the sex-unique characteristics of childbearing and dis-
tinguishes the historical status of women can resolve the pregnancy
dilemma. Justice cannot be achieved unless lawmakers acknowledge
that the degraded status of women is a function of the reproductive divi-
sion of labor. Finally, the preceding section demonstrates that the ERA
fails to resolve the pregnancy dilemma.
The State Interest in the Control of Reproduction
The relationship between constitutional law and personal "lifestyle"
choices such as decisions concerning marriage and divorce, procreation,
extrafamilial associations, personal sexual conduct and personal ap-
pearance has been documented.5 It has been noted with regard to the
first three choices that "[t]he state, through its police power, has tradi-
tionally regulated popular morality, and the Supreme Court still formally
acknowledges that domestic relations 'ha[ve] long been regarded as a
virtually exclusive province of the States.'"" Legislative schemes
which encourage marriage but discourage divorce, encourage procrea-
2 434 U.S. 136 (1977).
Id at 145.
See Wilkinson & White, Constitutional Protection for Personal Lifestyles, 62 CoR-
NELL L. REv. 563 (1977).
Id at 566 (quoting Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975)).
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tion by discouraging contraception and abortion, discourage nonfamilial
living arrangements and prohibit homosexual behavior serve the pur-
pose of preserving the family unit.
[R]emoval of legal constraints on lifestyle freedoms may jeopardize
the most hallowed and basic institutions of society. Thus state regula-
tion of matters such as divorce and sexual conduct becomes a means
of fortifying institutions, such as marriage and family, that impart
meaning and elevation to human life.
... [T]he state's proper concern derives from the basic functions
performed by "family" units in society: from sexual fulfillment and
reproduction, to education and rearing of the young, to economic sup-
port and emotional security.'
There are other sorts of concerns the state may pursue at the ex-
pense of personal choices. Maher v. Roem established that a state may
refuse to fund nontherapeutic abortions through public assistance pro-
grams, even if that refusal has the effect of precluding a poor woman
from exercising her right under Roe v. Wade"9 to choose an abortion.
After stating that "[t]he State unquestionably has a 'strong and
legitimate interest in encouraging normal childbirth,' . . . an interest
honored over the centuries,""0 the Court added in a footnote:
In addition to the direct interest in protecting the fetus, a State
may have legitimate demographic concerns about its rate of popula-
tion growth. Such concerns are basic to the future of the State and in
some circumstances could constitute a substantial reason for depar-
ture from a position of neutrality between abortion and childbirth."1
One gets the impression from such pronouncements, and from some of
the commentators' discussions, that these institutional and demographic
concerns are ancient and invulnerable.12 However, the broad aim
underlying the interest asserted by the state in any given case may not
really be legitimate. Moreover, even if the state is properly concerned
with a given subject matter, its regulation thereof does not necessarily
reflect a just respect for all its citizens. The Constitution, if it is to have
meaning for the majority, must take cognizance of the fact that an
asserted interest in promoting marriage, encouraging childbirth, pro-
tecting the family or engineering the state's demography may actually
be, in purpose and effect, a mere defense of the systems of male
privilege. Social purposes promulgated by those in power must be
measured against the realities of traditional social arrangements.
"' Wilkinson & White, supra note 255, at 622-23.
2 432 U.S. 464 (1977); accord, Harris v. McRae, 100 S. Ct. 2671 (1980); Beal v. Doe, 432
U.S. 438 (1977).
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
' 432 U.S. at 478 (citation omitted).
Id. at 478 n.11.
See, e.g., Wilkinson & White, supra note 255.
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The Importance of an Historical View
With regard to any disfavored group, present inequities cannot be
measured nor can a just future society be envisioned without some
assessment of the historical circumstances which led to that group's
disfavored status." That constitutional analysis can, and should, pro-
ceed with a view to history is evinced by landmark developments in
race discrimination litigation. It has been said, for example, that in
Brown v. Board of Education,'2 the Court opened its eyes to "the record
of history,"' 5 and recognized that a racially segregated order "conveys
strong social stigma and perpetuates both the stereotypes of racial in-
feriority and the circumstances on which such stereotypes feed."' No
one can argue that Brown completely erased the tragedy of racial in-
justice, but it did mark a leap in judicial understanding of the issue in-
sofar as that decision synthesized for the first time the history of
racism, its present manifestations and the necessity of sweeping institu-
tional rearrangements. Such a synthesis is crucial to the cause of sexual
justice. Progress in the legal realm will not be available to women until
seminal historical and psychological studies documenting the adverse
impact of sex discrimination on women are incorporated into the con-
stitutional argument.
First, it must be recognized that a condition as pernicious as racial
segregation exists. The preceding sections of this article have sug-
gested that an oppressive state of segregation does exist; not segrega-
tion analogous to that in the case of race, but rather the judicially en-
dorsed segregation of the status of women in their procreative capaci-
ties from the status of full citizenship. Next, the pervasive historical
underpinnings of the oppression of women must be recognized. It has
been argued that the subjection of women is a basic form of dominance
in that women have been relegated to the home regardless of their
The literature on women-both feminist and anti-feminist-is a long
rumination on the question of the nature and genesis of women's oppression
and social subordination. The question is not a trivial one, since the answers
given it determine our visions of the future, and our evaluation of whether or
not it is realistic to hope for a sexually egalitarian society. More importantly,
the analysis of the causes of women's oppression forms the basis for any
assessment of just what would have to be changed in order to achieve a society
without gender hierarchy.
Rubin, The Traffic in Women, in FEMINIST FRAMEWORKS 154-55 (A. Jaggar & P. Struhi eds.
1978).
1" 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1,
65 (1955).
1 L. TRIBE, supra note 28, § 16-15, at 1021. The Court cited various studies documenting
the adverse psychological impact of racial segregation. See 347 U.S. at 494 n.11.
[Vol. 56:375
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racial or socio-economic status.17 This historical subjection of women is
based upon biological differences between the sexes which resulted in a
basic division of labor along domestic and nondomestic lines: men were
out in the world developing culture and a market, while women, due to
pregnancy, nursing and the maintenance of children, were restricted in
their function to childbearing and the productive tasks that could be ac-
complished in the home. This division of labor, originating in biological
circumstance, became a necessity: ensuring reproduction and a stable
population was necessary to sustain first, an agricultural, and later, an
industrial society.2' Legal sanctions and prohibitions have historically
served to reinforce this social framework. The law has regulated
methods of giving birth, has allocated and reallocated the financial
burdens of childrearing and has allowed those who choose not to con-
form to the historical stereotype to suffer severe consequences."9
Though the historical subjection of women was premised on biological
differences, the present institutions and customs which rest on that sub-
jection cannot be justified by reference to the "nature of things."
Whatever the elements of necessity that once prescribed the social
order, they no longer exist. The present order, even insofar as it still
rests upon the biological division of labor, is a matter not of necessity,
but of ideology. 0
This article postulates that women do comprise a constitutionally
cognizable class. It has long been an argument against the recognition of
the oppression of women that they are not "insular," but rather are
evenly distributed throughout all strata of society. In fact, all women
"' See generally G. BARKER-BENFIELD, THE HORRORS OF THE HALF-KNOWN LFE. (1976); S.
FIRESTONE, THE DIALECTIC OF SEX (1971); L. GORDON, WOMAN'S BODY, WOMAN'S RIGHT (1976);
L. KANOWITZ, WOMEN AND THE LAW (1969); A. RICH, OF WOMAN BORN (1976); R. WERTZ & D.
WERTZ, LYING-IN (1977).
'" It is no accident that the statutes and common law doctrines which conceived of
women and children as private property are breaking down only in this century when the
social order is not so largely dependent on the supply of workers and heirs.
" A judicially sanctioned system of disability benefits, for example, which has the
greatest adverse impact on a single mother, demonstrates the penalty of not conforming to
this reproductive division of labor. See L. GORDON, supra note 267.
170 Poet, critic and philosopher Adrienne Rich has stated this proposition pointedly:
How have women given birth, who has helped them, and how, and why?
These are not simply questions of the history of midwifery and obstetrics:
they are political questions. The woman awaiting her period, or the onset of
labor, the woman lying on a table undergoing abortion or pushing her baby
out, the woman inserting a diaphragm or swallowing her daily pill, is doing
these things under the influence of centuries of imprinting. Her
choices-when she has any-are made, or outlawed, within the context of laws
and professional codes, religious sanctions and ethnic traditions, from whose
creation women have been historically excluded.
A. RICH, supra note 267, at 128.
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are functionally lumped together according to their procreative capaci-
ties." This is so because, even though only the anatomical differences
between the sexes are actually static, it is the functions of those dif-
ferences in reproduction which are conceived to be static. Thus, women
are culturally determined to be necessarily of a different type, and the
anatomical differences per se are allowed to have virtually unlimited re-
percussions in every other sphere in which women participate. Though
the pregnancy cases might lead us to conclude that only individual preg-
nant women suffer the consequences of the reproductive division of
labor, in fact the burden is on women as a class, because of the failure to
distinguish between static anatomical differences and the potential pro-
cess of reproduction. In light of these considerations, the differing views
of three types of reformers will be analyzed in order to demonstrate the
need for a broader framework in which to address the issue of pregnancy.
The Liberal View
John Stuart Mill, liberal feminism's most illustrious proponent,
argued strenuously against the arbitrariness of the present system,
characterizing it as the product of "custom" and "feeling" which "owed
their existence to other causes than their soundness, and ... derived
their power from the worse rather than the better parts of human
nature." 2 He recognized that the fundamental nature of the reproduc-
tive division of labor had resulted in the sexual and reproductive ser-
vices of women being treated as commodities in a system of exchange
ruled by force,"3 and that these relations between male and female
became regularized and institutionalized by law and politics. Although
Mill, writing in the mid-nineteenth century, found the law of the
strongest to have been abandoned as a general principle of social life,
the subjection of women still persisted in his time and continues to per-
sist today. "[I]t is the primitive state of slavery lasting on .... [H]ow
slowly these bad institutions give way, one at a time, the weakest first,
beginning with those which are least interwoven with the daily habits of
life.""'
2" This cultural separation due to procreative capability is most readily apparent in
language by use of terms such as "editrix," "aviatrix," and "lady lawyer." See generally R.
LAKOFF, LANGUAGE AND WOMAN'S PLACE (1975). The functional classification of women is
dramatically apparent in common idioms. Adrienne Rich has given considerable thought,
for example, to the term "barren woman," a synonym within patriarchal institutions for
ultimate "human failure." See A. RICH, supra note 267, at 249-53.
r J. MILL, THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN 7 (2d ed. 1869).
"s "[F]rom the very earliest twilight of human society, every woman (owing to the value
attached to her by men, combined with her inferiority in muscular strength) was found in a
state of bondage to some man." Id. at 8.
' Id. at 9-11.
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For Mill, then, the biological differentiation between men and women
was the circumstance occasioning the construction of the social order
oppressive to women. But Mill does not follow through on his own
historical explanation. His concern is ultimately with the contemporary
manifestations of inequality, without focusing on the biological under-
pinnings. He argues for the repeal of laws denying women property
rights, suffrage and political rights, rights within marriage and signifi-
cant employment. The declaration of formal equality through law is the
substance of Millian reform.
The pursuit of formal equality also characterizes contemporary liberal
feminism. The liberal feminist believes that "an individual woman
should be able to determine her social role with as great a freedom as
does a man."" This freedom results primarily from the elimination of
legal constraints and the achievement of equal civil rights, thus allowing
the individual woman to compete equally in the marketplace. The liberal
feminist thus emphasizes the equal opportunity for the individual in the
here and now, with no consistent focus on the particular historical
features of the subjection of women as a group.
This nonhistorical formal equalization of men and women measures
the rights extended by a traditional patriarchical standard. It may
result in significant employment, but once that is achieved there are
numerous other individual struggles to be faced, including the issues of
maternity and paternity leave. In contrast, true equality requires not
just women in men's jobs and operating men's institutions, but also that
those institutions be replaced by others broad enough to accommodate
the full range of human activities.' 8 To demand only the chance to com-
pete is to embrace the status quo in a way that tends to sanction op-
pressive arrangements -for example, the necessity of choosing between
children and career. Moreover, to ask only for equal opportunities to
compete is to obscure the fact that the restrictions presently imposed
on individual women are functions of -class characteristics. The emphasis
comes to be on the exceptional woman, on the one who has overcome the
obstacle of womanhood, and future change is hindered by throwing the
blame for circumstances of class onto individual capabilities. 7 The fail-
ings of the liberal feminist's concept of equality result from the fallacy
inherent in the liberal vision: that men are the norm. Maleness con-
tinues to be the norm without taking into account the exclusion of
" A. Jaggar, Political Philosophies of Women's Liberation, in FEMNISM AND PHLOSOPHY
7 (M. Vetterling-Braggin, F. Elliston & J. English eds. 1977).
=' See notes 340-45 & accompanying text infra.
r" This insistence on individual struggle, it has been argued, is divisive and encourages
tokenism. See N. Weston, A Humanist Theory of Feminism: Historical Foundations in John




women from the building of our institutions; maleness continues to be
the norm if, without a perception of the effect of class characteristics,
the success of women is measured by the performance of individual
women within male institutions.
The fallacy precludes further progress in the pregnancy context. For
example, the liberal feminist argument may be formulated as follows:
With regard to (possibly paid) maternity leaves and the employer's
obligation to reemploy a woman after such a leave, the liberal argues
that the bearing of children has at least as good a claim to be regarded
as social service as does a man's jury or military obligation, and that
childbearing should therefore carry corresponding rights to protec-
tion."8
The importance of this statement is the attempt to analogize pregnancy
to any condition or enterprise. In the pregnancy/disability cases, the
temptation to analogize was quite strong, not due simply to the facts,
but also because argument from analogy preserves the standard of ab-
solute equality and establishes the premise of "similar situation" for
equal protection purposes. The Supreme Court, however, did not accept
the argument that prostatectomy is like pregnancy in being unique to
one sex, nor that cosmetic surgery is like pregnancy in being voluntary,
nor that heart attack is like pregnancy in being potentially expensive,
but chose rather to emphasize the imperfect fit of'all such analogiesY
Therefore, liberal feminism, in permitting maleness to be the norm and
in relying on analogy, seems unable to penetrate the current structure
of the pregnancy/disability dilemma.
The Assimilationist View
A creative and more extreme version of the liberal feminist view of
equality is the assimilationist solution to the issue of sexism. According
to the assimilationist ideal, a nonsexist society would be one in which
the sex of an individual would be the functional equivalent of the eye
color of individuals in our society today: no legal, institutional, nor even
significant personal distinctions would be made on the basis of sex.10
Those who oppose the assimilationist ideal, the assimilationist argues,
rely on biological differences in men and women to justify social dif-
ferentiation; however, it is sex-role differentiation rather than actual
anatomical dissimilarity which underlies present social arrangements.
The actual physical dissimilarities have no relevance to those ar-
rangements: measurable differences in strength, for example, are no
longer important, since the Industrial Revolution rendered raw physical
,' A. Jaggar, supra note 275, at 8.
For a discussion of these cases, see notes 11-67 & accompanying text supra.
Wasserstrom, Racism, Sexism, and Preferential Treatment. An Approach to the
Topics, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 581, 604 (1977).
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strength unnecessary in most situations. 1 Strength and other minor
physiological differences, like eye color or the physiological characteris-
tics that can be shown to differentiate the races, are not "even relevant
to the appropriate distribution of any political, institutional, or interper-
sonal concerns in the good society. ' ' 2
Assimilationists concede that pregnancy presents a special obstacle
to total assimilation of the sexes. Nevertheless, the assimilationist
response is to excise this basic sex-unique capability from the repertoire
of female functions. They argue that "[g]iven the present state of
medical knowledge and the natural realities of female pregnancy," the
necessity of in utero pregnancy may be avoided." Through the develop-
ment and implementation of artificial reproduction, or at least extra-
uterine gestation, women may be freed "from the tyranny of their
reproductive biology by every means available."' In the alternative,
the assimilationist argues that even if the respective physiological
capabilities are unchanged, "society could still elect to develop institu-
tions that would nullify the effect of the natural differences."M
However, the effects of pregnancy could be nullified only if pregnancy
were strictly confined to the category of "disability," if it were treated
like a growth to be removed, if pregnant workers departed from and
returned to work without recognition of their new motherly status and
if the heterosexual nuclear family were abolished and social institutions
for childrearing developed so that the birth would have no effect on the
life of the pregnant person. In short, the assimilationist ideal requires
the virtual elimination of pregnancy as we know it from the social ex-
perience.ns
Two basic criticisms may be lodged against the assimilationist view.
First, it trivializes sex differences which in fact have significant and
necessary repercussions. Second, it commits society to creating similarity
1 Id. at 611. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 &
Supp. 11 1979), generally precludes employer refusal to hire women because of alleged dif-
ferences between the sexes in physical strength. See, e.g., Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co.,
444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971).
U2 Wasserstrom, supra note 280, at 609.
Id. at 611-12.
S. FIRESTONE, supra note 267, at 206.
IM Wasserstrom, supra note 280, at 612-13.
2" Wasserstrom argues that pregnancy must be "assimilated" because he believes that
unacceptable social differentiation between men and women could always, and perhaps
would always, be predicated upon the biological phenomena.
Any nonassimilationist society will have sex roles. Any nonassimilationist
society will have some institutions that distinguish between individuals by vir-
tue of their gender, and any such society will necessarily teach the desirability
of doing so. Any substantially nonassimilationist society will make one's sex-
ual identity an important characteristic, so that there are substantial
psychological, role, and status differences between persons who are males and
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between men and women. Further, practically speaking, this trivializing
and institutional engineering approach leaves no room for, and indeed
precludes, our enjoyment of sex differentiation.281 In fact, the assimila-
tionist scheme is no more successful than the liberal view because it too
is premised upon an acceptance of maleness as the norm. While the nor-
malization of maleness leads the liberal to analogize pregnancy to other
conditions, it leads the assimilationist to argue for the "nullification" of
pregnancy in order to achieve similarity in the situations of the sexes.
This solution is arguably a result of the failure to follow through on the
historical realities. The fundamental circumstance giving rise to the
historical subjection of women is "the fact that reproduction of the
human species requires that the fetus develop in utero for a period of
months,"' but this historical premise does not necessarily lead to the
conclusion that in utero pregnancy must be nullified. Rather, the targets
for nullification should be arbitrary conclusions which rest upon the
premise of pregnancy. To say that pregnancy should be nullified be-
cause it is the one inexorable difference between the sexes is as in-
sulting and unrealistic as to say equality requires that men, uniquely
handicapped in their reproductive incapacity when compared to the
female norm, should be artificially equipped to bear children.
Like the liberal feminist perspective, the assimilationist argument
fails to recognize that invidious sex-role differentiation inevitably
results from treating either sex role as a paradigm. As a result,
[gyiven this state of things, either we have to seek a least common
denominator to represent us-which in truth would not be a human
representation at all-or we have to identify the concerns of both
sexes with the concerns of one-not a propitious beginning for plan-
ning a just society. It is a conceptual dilemma.9
The Bivalent View
The principle of absolute equality is an alluring one, yet it can have
perverse effects, especially in the area of pregnancy. ° The opposite
those who are females. Even if these could be attained without systemic
dominance of one sex over the other, they would, I think, be objectionable on
the ground that they necessarily impaired an individual's ability to develop his
or her own characteristics, talents and capacities to the fullest extent to which
he or she might desire. Sex roles, and all that accompany them, necessarily im-
pose limits-restrictions on what one can do, be or become. As such, they are,
I think, at least prima facie wrong.
Id. at 614.
See E. WOLGAST, EQUALITY AND THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN 30-34 (1980).
2' Wasserstrom, supra note 280, at 611.
E. WOLGAST, supra note 287, at 133.
' Even without troublesome applications in areas such as pregnancy, the principle of ab-
solute equality can itself be carried to an absurd and frightening extreme. To illustrate this
[Vol. 56:375
FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE
response from that of the liberal feminists and the assimilationists is a
bivalent view which, far from nullifying the distinctions between the
sexes, specifically emphasizes the differences. Proponents of the
bivalent view argue:
[The implications of biology are pervasive. The idea that, under propi-
tious conditions, sex differences can be flattened out or "nullified"
does not seem either necessary or attractive. Nor is it clearly possi-
ble. It may be no more possible for us to treat people of different
sexes alike than it is for us to treat a baby as an adult, or an elderly
man as a youth. Some differences cannot be discounted."'
In thinking about the rights of women, the possibility that real dif-
ferences between the sexes should be taken into account is often over-
looked because it is perceived as being inconsistent with the ideal of
equality. Blind adherence to the ideal of equality, however, and the anti-
discrimination principle which historically attends it, traps us into the
notion that maleness is the norm."I Reliance on the ideal of equality led
directly to a grotesque and irrational formulation of the issue in
Geduldig v. Aiello. 3 The Supreme Court could reason that as long as
pregnancy benefits were "possessed by everyone in case he or she
should ever qualify for them," a denial of benefits of all did not un-
constitutionally deprive any particular group."4
The proponents of the bivalent view recommend the development of a
dual system of rights-equal rights and "special rights": "The two kinds
of rights, equal and differential (or special), work very differently. With
regard to an equal right, taking a person's individual qualities into ac-
count may constitute discrimination. But with special rights, they must
be taken into account, for these rights are based on human differ-
ences. '""I The concept of discrimination has no meaning when applied to
special rights. To fail to provide wheelchair ramps for the handicapped,
for example, is not to discriminate against them, but rather to treat
them unjustly by failing to account for their special needs."6
idea, Wolgast cites a short story by Kurt Vonnegut. K. VONNEGUT, Harrison Bergerson, in
WELCOME TO THE MONKEY HousE (1961), cited in E. WOLGAST, supra note 287, at 43.
Therein, equality of all citizens in the year 2081 is assured by the United States Handicap-
per General who, by use of some ingenious hardware, renders all citizens equally stupid,
equally inarticulate and equally ugly. Interestingly, the Handicapper General did not at-
tempt to create androgyny. Sexual differentiation must have appeared to her, as it appears
to Wolgast, to be an unassimilable phenomenon.
21 E. WOLGAST, supra note 287, at 34 (footnote omitted).
' "The demand for equal rights, understood as a step toward revising concepts about
women and giving them greater importance in social thinking, is an exercise in futility. In
using this argument, women undertake to conform to what the model dictates." Id. at 156.
m 417 U.S. 484 (1974). See generally notes 11-28 & accompanying text supra.
' E. WOLGAST, supra note 287, at 48; see id. at 48-49.
" Id at 42. As Aristotle once said: "Injustice arises when equals are treated unequally
and when unequals are treated equally." ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS V.
2 See E. WOLGAST, supra note 287, at 51.
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One proponent of the bivalent view argues that the special needs of
women which must be accounted for go beyond matters relating to repro-
duction: "[A] bivalent form of thinking [is needed], a form that dis-
tinguishes between the interests of men and the interests of women."'
The differences between women and men are due not only to culture
and conditioning, it is argued, but also due to innate psychological differ-
ences2 8 which have an "obvious" connection to physiological differences
and comfortable sex roles.299 Thus, it is argued that the law should take
many kinds of differential qualities into account: "The truth is that the
two sexes are not fungible; a community made up exclusively of one is
different from a community composed of both; the subtle interplay of in-
fluence one on the other is among the imponderables. '" ' °
The assimilationist and bivalent perspectives are vastly divergent.
The former, even in its least controversial mode, would take account of
sex differences only in social interactions and with regard to some
nongovernmental institutional arrangements; another assimilationist
model would not acknowledge sex differences in any sphere."1 The biva-
lent view on the other hand would have a number of political, institu-
tional and social arrangements depend to some extent on sex dif-
ferences which are argued to be measurable and consequential. While
the assimilationist model can be criticized for failing to maintain an
historical perspective, for turning the ideal of "equality" into "equaliza-
tion" in a way that denigrates women, the problem with the bivalent
approach as an alternative is that it does just the opposite. For the
Supreme Court to utilize the bivalent approach would be a constitu-
tional disaster; that female infants have the tactile response at birth
which is a precondition for empathy and imagination, that females
mature faster, that young females have greater verbal ability and young
males have greater visual-spatial ability, that young males become bet-
ter at mathematics and that males are more aggressive3"2 are inap-
propriate factors for the Court to consider in rendering its decisions.
There is a substantial controversy over the existence of these dif-
ferential qualities, but unreliability is not their greatest drawback. The
bivalent approach not only precludes a truly visionary account of human
possibilities, but without a rule limiting which differences between the
Id. at 16.
ns See id. at 125-31 (citing, e.g., J. BARDWICK, PSYCHOLOGY OF WOMEN 102 (1971); E.
MACOBY & C. JACKLIN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SEX DIFFERENCES 349-55, 360-63 (1974)).
m E. WOLGAST, supra note 287, at 127.
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 532 (1976), quoted in E. WOLGAST, supra note 287, at
86. It should be noted that it is not clear that the Court intended this language to be used in
the way that Wolgast endorses.
30 Wasserstrom, supra note 280, at 603-06.
See E. WOLGAST, supra note 287, at 126.
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sexes can be taken into account and a requirement that in all other cir-
cumstances men and women be treated as equals, its proponents have
their feet precariously planted on the slippery slope of judicial
stereotyping. For example, in Kahn v. Shevin, °30 the Supreme Court
upheld a Florida property tax exemption which was available automati-
cally to widows but not to widowers, regardless of the latter's need.,"
Justice Douglas' majority opinion which justified the so-called "benign
discrimination" in favor of women is seemingly inconsistent with his
conclusion the previous term in Frontiero v. Richardson 5 that gender-
based classifications should be suspect. This logical inconsistency could
be explained away under a bivalent system of special rights,"" based in
this case upon the adverse economic circumstances which result from
women being widowed." No one could fail to respond to the plight of
poor widows whose "inability to compete for the necessities of life is a
legitimate concern of society,' 'ns but the legitimate concern is typically
pursued in a myopic, paternalistic manner. As the dissenters pointed
out in Kahn, the statute was overinclusive in that it provided for every
"financially independent heiress" as well as for needy widows,0 9 and
underinclusive insofar as it did not provide for poor widowers.31
Moreover, the statute had the perverse effect of discriminating against
women. It is as if the Florida legislature had enacted two statutes: one
preferring widows over widowers for tax exemption purposes, and
another preferring husbands over wives insofar as either would wish to
416 U.S. 351 (1974).
3 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 196.202 (Supp. 1981).
411 U.S. 677 (1973).
1 Actually, Justice Douglas' apparent inconsistency probably did not result from any
such theory, but rather from stereotypes about women to which he subscribed. Benign
discrimination was acceptable to him only in favor of women. The day before his decision in
Kahn, Justice Douglas dissented on the finding of mootness in DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416
U.S. 312 (1974), a case involving preferential educational admissions treatment for
minorities, and stated: "There is no constitutional right for any race to be preferred." Id. at
336. It should also be noted that Justice Brennan's plurality opinion in Frontiero, in which
Justice Douglas joined, allows that the strict scrutiny in gender cases advocated therein
might not apply to classifications "designed to rectify the effects of past discrimination
against women." 411 U.S. at 689 n.22.
" Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. at 353-54.
m' E. WOLGAST, supra note 287, at 91.
' Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 360 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
310 Id. at 360-62 (White, J., dissenting). The posture suggested by Justice White's dissent
has been greatly elaborated upon in Kanowitz, "Benign" Sex Discrimination. Its Troubles
and Their Cure, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 1379 (1980). Professor Kanowitz demonstrates that the
majority's analysis in Kahn is deficient, among other reasons, because it fails to account for
discrimination against males. A widower who, for example, had been dependent solely upon
his deceased wife, and thus sorely in need of a tax break, might be said to have been the
victim of past discrimination based on stereotypical thinking about men's and women's
roles. Id. at 1388.
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secure the economic well-being of his or her surviving spouse., Finally,
the legitimate concern, which proponents of the bivalent view would
also endorse, is likely a disingenuous post hoc justification.12
Of all the defects in Kahn, it is the pernicious tendency of the classifi-
cation to reinforce stereotypical assumptions about the dependency of
women that most undermines the bivalent camp's endorsement: "The
Court was deluded into thinking that a paternalistic statute, typical of
sexist thinking, is actually somewhat akin to an 'affirmative action'
statute."'313 If the doctrine of special rights goes so far as to allow legisla-
tors to devise any slipshod scheme to "protect" or "compensate"
women," ' it goes too far. A return to that way of thinking which has only
so recently given way must be guarded against. New arguments for
change must not play into stereotypical notions .about womanhood.
Rather, the new approach should carefully account for the historical ex-
clusion of women based on the basic difference in reproductive capabili-
ties and argue for the inclusion of women, with due regard for their
reproductive capabilities, in every aspect of society.
31 Kanowitz, supra note 310, at 1407. The interest of a working person in the financial
well-being of his or her surviving spouse has been recognized by the Court to repudiate
claims that legislative schemes not unlike that upheld in Kahn discriminate only against the
surviving spouse. See, e.g., Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 147 (1980);
Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 205-07 (1977).
31 As Justice Stevens recognized, the Florida statute in Kahn originated in 1885: "[A]
discrimination of that vintage cannot reasonably be supposed to have been motivated by a
decision to repudiate the 19th Century presumption that females are inferior to males."
Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 223 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring). Rather, "discrimina-
tion against a group of males is merely the accidental by-product of a traditional way of
thinking about females." Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
3,3 Erickson, Kahn, Ballard & Wiesenfeld: A New Equal Protection Test in "Reverse"
Discrimination Cases?, 42 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1, 11 (1975).
"' A particularly troubling decision in this regard is Vorchheimer v. School Dist., 532
F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976), affd by an equally divided Court, 430 U.S. 703 (1977), in which the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the equal protection claim of a young woman who
wished to attend the public school for academically distinguished males in a city which also
maintains, in an otherwise sexually integrated secondary system, a school for academically
distinguished females. In denying her admission, the court rejected an analogy to Sweatt v.
Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950), stating:
We are committed to the concept that there is no fundamental difference be-
tween races and therefore, in justice, there can be no dissimilar treatment.
But there are differences between the sexes which may, in limited circum-
stances, justify disparity in the law.
• . .[S]pecial emotional problems of the adolescent years are matters of
human experience and have led some educational experts to opt for single-sex
high schools. While this policy has limited acceptance on its merits, it does
have its basis in a theory of equal benefits and not discriminatory denial.
532 F.2d at 886-87. Thus, the court expressly adopted a "separate but equal" policy, remini-
scent of the Supreme Court's decision regarding racial segregation in Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537 (1896). What is particularly disturbing about Vorchheimer is its failure to grap-
ple specifically with alleged differences between the sexes, and its reference to "matters of
human experience" as authority for the classification. This general doctrine of differences




As an alternative to the three foregoing visions of justice, this article
proposes that the law should account for sex differences in a strictly
limited way. Women should be recognized to have rights different from
men only insofar as pregnancy and breastfeeding, the only aspects of
childbearing and childrearing completely unique to women, are directly
concerned. Recognizing these differences in law is qualitatively dif-
ferent from nullifying them; it is qualitatively different from analogizing
childbirth to jury service; it is also a far cry from an approach that pro-
jects uniqueness, and therefore social and legal consequences, onto
every conceivable sex-specific trait. This proposal embraces the unique-
ness of pregnancy and breastfeeding in just the way that Congress failed
to do.
The Accommodation of the Experience
The only differences between the sexes which apparently cannot be
ignored are in utero pregnancy,"5 and breastfeeding, the one function in
the childrearing process which only women can perform. In observing
that these are the capabilities which really differentiate women from
men, it is crucial that we overcome any aversion to describing these
functions as "unique." Uniqueness is a "trap" ' 6 only in terms of an
analysis, such as that generated in Geduldig v. Aiello, 17 which assumes
that maleness is the norm. "Unique" does not mean uniquely handi-
capped.
The statement that the unique capabilities of pregnancy and breast-
feeding should be accounted for is not to say that women should receive
a special favor or any boon incommensurate with their rights as citi-
zens. Legal arguments too often revolve merely around the question of
whether a particular quality should be "taken into account." A classifica-
tion is insidious, however, only when the legal cognizance of that quality
has an adverse impact on some recognizable group. Classifications must
be evaluated in terms of the real world. What is at stake is not a right
to be free from classification, but rather a right not to be classified in a
degrading manner.
Viewed from the perspective of social reality it should be clear, too,
that racism and sexism should not be thought of as phenomena that
"' See Wasserstrom, supra note 280, at 611 ('[T]he only fact that seems required to be
taken into account is the fact that reproduction of the human species requires that the fetus
develop in utero for a period of months.").
"I See, e.g., Bartlett, supra note 39.
3" 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
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consist simply in taking a person's race or sex into account, or even
simply in taking a person's race or sex into account in an arbitrary
way. Instead, racism and sexism consist in taking race and sex into
account in a certain way, in the context of a specific set of institu-
tional arrangements and a specific ideology which together create
and maintain a system of unjust institutions and unwarranted beliefs
and attitudes.3 18
The historical view outlined in this article describes how women's
status results from their procreative abilities having been taken into
account in a certain degrading way. This article proposes that women's
procreative abilities should be taken specially into account, but not in a
degrading way. To account for pregnancy and breastfeeding is rather to
treat women as equals 19 by respecting the female gender and by ceasing
to impose upon women a bifurcated existence; it is to reject antiquated
classifications and to restore to women the opportunity to live a con-
tinuous life, integrated with respect to career and procreation just as
are the lives of men.
The incorporation of pregnancy and breastfeeding into the social con-
tinuum as proposed here has the advantage of reflecting the realities of
women's lives. Of course, it may be true that some of the problems
generated by the historical differentiation would be eliminated if bio-
logical reproduction were eliminated. Nevertheless, it is safe to say, at
least for the present, that women will continue to have children and that
women will require respect for their procreative choices. The creative
equalization or assimilationist approach requires a biological revolution
which has not transpired, and which should not be forced upon any
woman even when available. The current liberal way of thinking tends
to minimize the childbearing process in an unrealistic way. A woman
who has a very limited amount of paid leave available, on a level co-
extensive with that available for illness or disability, will not always be
able to make an immediate reappearance in the work force."n There are
318 Wasserstrom, supra note 280, at 591-92 (emphasis added).
319 The introduction into this discussion of the concept of equality win fare better if
Ronald Dworkin's distinction between the right to equal treatment and the right to treat-
ment as an equal is recalled. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 227 (1977). The
former requires the same distribution of a burden or benefit, while the latter requires that
each person be treated with the respect and concern shown anyone else:
It I have two children, and one is dying from a disease that is making the
other uncomfortable, I do not show equal concern if I flip a coin to decide
which should have the remaining dose of a drug.... [Tlhe right to treatment
as an equal is fundamental, and the right to equal treatment, derivative. In
some circumstances the right to treatment as an equal will entail a right to
equal treatment, but not, by any means, in all circumstances.
IM
A woman in such a situation will not be able to achieve continuity in her life unless she
is the stereotypical "squatting Indian" who, by virtue of superior physical, emotional and
spiritual strength, disappears from her tribe for a few minutes only to return from the
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sometimes physical and psychological traumas connected with child-
birth, and a nonsexist society must be able to accommodate them with-
out divesting the mother of her citizenship.
Justice does not require that we reject motherhood. Rather, we must
recognize the distinction between the experience of motherhood and the
historical institution of motherhood. The experience of childbearing is
eminently worth preserving, especially as that experience might tran-
spire in a different political and emotional context.
Ideally, of course, women would choose not only whether, when,
and where to bear children, and the circumstances of labor, but also
between biological and artificial reproduction. Ideally, the process of
creating another life would be freely and intelligently undertaken,
much as a woman might prepare herself physically and mentally for a
trip across country by jeep, or an archealogical "dig"; or might choose
to do something else altogether." '
The historical institution of motherhood with its many restraints and its
destructive ideology, treats women as less than full-fledged humans and
in so doing alienates women from the experience itself. However, the
experience is, or could be, profoundly human and enriching.
Legal Results and Institutional Reforms
The incorporationist approach directs opposite results from those
reached by the Supreme Court in the pregnancy cases under both the
equal protection clause and Title VII. In light of the historical burdens
imposed on women due to their procreative capacities, it would be sex
discrimination of the most invidious kind to refuse to provide employ-
ment-related benefits to pregnant workers. Likewise, a prohibition on
breastfeeding at the workplace would discriminatorily preclude women
from carrying out their family responsibilities.
Such reliance on the antidiscrimination principle may strike many
as inappropriate and unnecessary. That is, the notion of discrimination
is compromised by forcing a comparison between male and female ac-
tivities where no such comparison is possible. Thus, to attempt to
secure pregnancy and breastfeeding rights pursuant to the principle of
"equality," as embodied in the fourteenth amendment and title VII, is
to set foot again on the primrose path which led to Geduldig v. Aiello.2"
bushes with a healthy baby and an appetite for continued labor. Although such women are
to be admired, to expect every pregnant person to match them is just as unrealistically and
perniciously ideological as to expect a woman to stay at home being the center of the family
while her rich spouse pays the obstetrician's bills.
m A. RICH, supra note 267, at 174-75. Rich criticizes S. FIRESTONE, supra note 267, for her
failure to account for such a positive view of motherhood, see note 284 & accompanying text
supra. A. RICH, supra note 267, at 174. Indeed, Firestone, like assimilationists, is inclined to
throw the baby out with the bath water.
417 U.S. 484 (1974).
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Rather, some might argue, it would be more appropriate to premise
those rights on a substantive due process theory as did the famous
breastfeeding firefighter in Eaton v. City of Iowa City.23
As a practical matter, this argument favoring the use of due process
may prevail. Nevertheless, it seems a mere failure of imagination to
preclude the application of the principle of equality to the issues discussed
herein. It is possible to expand the universe of comparison for equal pro-
tection and Title VII purposes: instead of attempting to analogize
pregnancy to prostatectomy, for example, one could compare the oppor-
tunities of men and women, based upon their relative reproductive
capabilities, to participate fully in every human activity. Moreover,
though such a comparison might be difficult for constitutional and
statutory purposes, 2' those relative opportunities really are the issue,
and thus, equality is the issue. A right to breastfeed premised on the
due process clause would have the practical effect of securing that right,
but it would not illuminate the relation of that right to male-created in-
stitutions which had previously precluded its exercise. That is, pro-
creative rights premised on the principle of equality have the advantage
of the historical perspective. The original inequity, the reproductive
division of labor on which all other sexual inequities are premised, must
be addressed, or else any vision of a nonsexist society will be inade-
quate. The principle of equality imposes stringent demands, but the
magnitude of the task must not stand in the way of its completion.
The principle of equality has the added advantage, having first forced
us to focus on the historical exclusion of women from the institution-
building process, of directing our attention to the present manifesta-
tions of male dominance within institutions. The incorporationist ideal
requires the legislatively-mandated and judicially-enforced restructur-
ing of many institutions."2 First are those changes to be brought about
in the workplace. Several reforms relative to working hours are re-
quired. Women with children usually cannot conform to the present
I Equity No. 44750 (Iowa Dist. Ct., Johnson County, dismissed Oct. 3, 1980). The plain-
tiff, Linda Eaton, sought and obtained a temporary injunction restraining the city and the
fire department from prohibiting her from breastfeeding her son at the fire station during
her "personal time." In support of her petition for a temporary writ of injunction, Ms.
Eaton relied upon her essential right to direct the upbringing of her child. Brief for Plaintiff
(citing Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1977);
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Pierce
v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)). She also relied upon her constitutional right to
privacy with regard to family matters. Brief for Plaintiff (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 413
(1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)).
See Larson, supra note 39, at 817-20.
The institutional arrangements which could be legislated are described in some detail
in Frug, Securing Job Market Equality for Womewn Labor Market Hostility to Working
Mothers, 1979 B.U. L. REV. 55 (1979), and Powers, Sex Segregation and the Ambivalent
Directions of Sex Discrimination Law, 1979 WIs. L. REV. 55.
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model which offers rewards, such as overtime pay and professional ad-
vancement, according to the number of hours worked per week. Only
childless people and men who have abdicated most of their family
responsibilities are free to become the company's loyal hero by spending
eighty hours per week in the office. Flexible time systems, which allow
either for a compressed work schedule or for varying schedules from
day to day, would free up both parents, and all other workers, for other
responsibilities. 26 Flexible time systems in practice have already shown
increased worker productivity without significant increased costs, 2
even though such arrangements have not been widely available.2 In
order to assure the effectiveness of a reorganized work week, the formal
work week could be reduced to below forty hours and the Fair Labor
Standards Act" could be extended to managerial and professional
employees." Such reforms would have the effect of equalizing the
availability of a male worker with a supportive female at home with
that of a female worker with family responsibilities. Similarly, part-time
work must be afforded the same respect, compensation and benefits as
full-time work."' Some full-time jobs could be expediently accomplished
by part-time workers, thus increasing the number of jobs and decreas-
ing unemployment.
In order to make this and similar proposals effective, reformers must
either seek the coercion of legislative enactment or devise some way to
make reduced work hours attractive to men. Otherwise, women will con-
tinue to be segregated in part-time and flexible-hour jobs, and men will
miss the benefits of the institutional restructuring. The proposals are
not designed to advance women but rather to chip away at the system
of sex-role differentiation which artificially restricts the choices of
women and men. As one authority has noted:
Although some legal change is occurring in the direction of reduced
working hours, particularly in connection with flexible scheduling, the
emphasis seems to be on facilitating the incorporation of women in
the paid work force consistent with their primary responsibilities for
work in the private sphere. Instead, the emphasis on the equal par-
ticipation of women and men stresses the importance of reduced
working-hours in the public sphere to enable the sexes to participate
equally in both the private and public spheres.3
See Frug, supra note 325, at 95-96; Powers, supra note 325, at 108-09.
17 Frug, supra note 325, at 95 n.236.
I Professor Frug suggests that the establishment of flexible time systems be required
of government contractors and recipients of federal assistance. Id at 96.
29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976 & Supp. I1 1979).
Powers, supra note 325, at 106-08.
=' Frug, supra note 325, at 96; Powers, supra note 325, at 109.
Powers, supra note 325, at 109 n.278.
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Proposals for formal reform require a concomitant social policy
recognizing the importance of unpaid private work for both women and
men, including housekeeping, childrearing, home improvement projects,
conservation projects and food production. The legitimacy of such ac-
tivities could be validated, and men attracted to such pursuits, by giving
legal status to private work; for example, by conferring independent
social security status on private workers and by making it possible for
them to establish private pension accounts.33 Another benefit of equaliz-
ing the availability of men and women workers will be to crack the foun-
dations of occupational segregation insofar as an individual woman's
time constraints retard her mobility within the labor structure. All
reforms must primarily target the pervasive problem of sexual segrega-
tion in the work force. 33
Of central concern are proposals which facilitate continuity between
the experience of childbearing and working. At a minimum, the mandate
of the PDA"i must be vigorously enforced, ensuring that disability, sick
leave and medical benefits available to other workers through employ-
ment are not arbitrarily withheld from pregnant workers. More can be
done. It has been noted:
The United States has the distinction of being the only major in-
dustrialized country in the world that lacks a national insurance plan
covering medical expenses for childbirth and is one of few govern-
ments in industrialized nations that does not provide any cash bene-
fits to working women to compensate for lost earnings.-
Any proposal for national health insurance must include coverage for
pregnancy-related expenses. Congress might also introduce programs
for specific pregnancy benefits, as did the Swedish Riksdag as early as
1931 in the recognition that "it was reasonable that public assistance
should be given to the person who, at great personal risk and economic
sacrifice, assured the continuation of society."' 7
Equally significant are accommodations of childrearing. The only
gender-specific aspect of childrearing which must be accepted is the
phenomenon of breastfeeding. Its benefits are documented;' its
naturalness is beyond dispute. The burden of proving that feeding will
not disrupt the workplace has too long been shouldered by the breast-
feeding worker; rather the burden should be on the individual employer
Id. at 110-12.
See Frug, supra note 325, at 98.
3 See note 152 supra.
33 C. ADAMS & K. WINSTON, supra note 161, at 33.
Id. at 28 (quoting 0. WANGSON, Maternal and Child Welfare, in SOCIAL WELFARE IN
SWEDEN 49 (1939)).
1 See, e.g., JELLIFFE & JELLIFFE, HUMAN MILK IN THE MODERN WORLD (1978-79);
American Ass'n of Pediatrics Standards on Infant Feeding and Nutrition.
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to show the impossibility of allowing a woman one or two thirty-minute
breaks in order to nurse her child, to show why breastfeeding cannot be
accomplished on the job. With the burden thus reversed, the simplicity
of accommodation will be realized. Employers' arguments against breast-
feeding will likely be shown to be of the ilk that was rejected in
Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur.
Gender-neutral childrearing supports must also be established. What-
ever parental leave an employer offers must be made equally available
to men and women. A commitment both to sex equality and to the family
experience might be implemented by looking to the Swedish example:
the mother and father are entitled to nine months' leave between them,
at ninety percent of their regular salaries, for the purpose of raising a
child." There must be incentives, such as the other proposals herein
might provide, for males to take advantage of such policies. The abdica-
tion of fatherly responsibility on any level can no longer be toleratedli
As support for ongoing childrearing duties, employers could provide
sick leave days for the illnesses of children and paid "family responsibility
days," available on an equal basis to male and female workers.u" Addi-
tionally and fundamentally, the government and the private sector must
take seriously the issue of child care. Proposals for a national child care
program must be revitalized,u and Congress should consider requiring
the private sector to provide care for children of all workers. Although
it is not economically feasible for any combination of public and private
resources to finance the parent who chooses to leave work for a number
of years to raise a child, the needs of the person who chooses to do so
and who then becomes ready to re-enter the labor market must be ac-
commodated. Positive law should be enacted prohibiting discrimination
on the basis of labor market absence, establishing and funding re-entry
training programs and exploring a system of "parent's preference"
which would determine public employment much like veteran's prefer-
ence provisions do. 44
3' 414 U.S. 632, 641 n.9 (1974) (rejecting argument that pregnant teachers be required to
leave work at end of fourth month in order to be spared "embarrassment at the hands of
giggling schoolchildren").
30 C. ADAMS & K. WINSTON, supra note 161, at 30.
u' The new Cuban Family Code, which went into effect on International Women's Day,
March 8, 1975, mandates paternal participation in every aspect of family life, including child
care and running the home. Such duties are not abrogated by the fact that the father may
provide the family's sole financial support. See CUBAN LAW. No. 1289, arts. 26-27, 83, 85
(1975).
See Frug, supra note 325, at 99. Sweden provides from 12 to 18 days yearly per
household for the purpose of caring for sick children. C. ADAMS & K. WINSTON, supra note
161, at 30.




Some of these reforms, such as national health insurance and national
pregnancy insurance, have effects beyond the sphere of employment.
Additional reforms are imperative in nonemployment-related areas.
Chief among any proposals for reform is the re-evaluation of family law
schemes which promote the financial dependence of women upon men
and which devolve upon women all the financial risks resulting from the
breakup of a relationship. The ideal of making women full social par-
ticipants requires at a minimum that property acquired during the rela-
tionship, whether it is formalized by marriage or not, be equally owned
and controlled, that support awards be determined with a commitment
to evaluating the real needs of the supported partner and children and
that such awards, for the first time, be strictly enforced."s
It must be emphasized that all of the proposals are interdependent: no
one program will achieve justice, nor will all such programs taken
together do so unless they are pursued fervently. This article has at-
tempted to illuminate the abyss between motherhood and citizenship in
a way that demonstrates the necessity of institutional rearrangements.
The understanding of society's treatment of pregnancy is the predicate
for the required commitment.
The Unjustifiable Traditional Order
Constitutional decisionmakers are reluctant to interfere with the
regulations concerning "personal" decisions, including those concerning
marriage and divorce, procreation and personal sexual conduct: 3
[]n areas involving traditional morality, society values law as much
for its instructional as for its coercive effect. Law is a vehicle by
which democratic majorities reaffirm shared moral aspirations and
summon society's allegiance to a common set of behavioral goals.
Deploying the Constitution to undermine conventional precepts of
domestic morality is a step not lightly takenY
The reforms endorsed herein are sweeping; admittedly, the implementa-
tion of those ideas would shake traditional ideas about family respon-
sibilities and would undermine other artifacts of sex-role differentiation.
Those arrangements which are most vulnerable, however, are insidious
in that they restrict women and punish women who do not abide by
them. The traditional order cannot be justified by reference to the will
of democratic society. Such justifications are part of positivist theories
of law which neither accurately describe the process of law-making nor
account for the historic role of courts in tempering the self-interested
US Powers, supra note 325, at 115-16.
"4 See notes 255-57 & accompanying text supra.
" Wilkinson & White, supra note 255, at 568.
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mandates of the powerful. The positivist construct of the "sovereign
will" factors out all substantive issues of power and value, thus becom-
ing "a trivial generalization" 8 about social conflicts and decisions and a
generalization, moreover, which serves as an all-purpose apology for the
status quo. The positivist view would have us believe that judicial deci-
sions affecting social norms are usurpations of the majoritarian process,
and are, therefore, anomalous episodes in the story of law. To the con-
trary, the authority of the judiciary to secure the rights of the power-
less is of the essence of the Republic, 9 thus imposing upon those ulti-
mate conservators of the Constitution an obligation to intervene when
majoritarian arrangements are shown to be oppressive: "[T]he Court's
authoritative responsibility is not to be too readily surrendered to the
exigencies of a society which has for the time being taken the market
place as its definitive model."no
Of course, the law will reflect some consensus of values, insofar as
any consensus can be ascertained, but in doing so it cannot ignore
changing social realities."l Legislators' dreams of the American way of
life should no longer be enforced at the expense of punishing unmarried
persons and imposing even more rigidity on the already inflexible sta-
tions of single parents. Women, especially minority women, should no
longer pay the lion's share of the cost of antiquated visions."s
CONCLUSION
The treatment of pregnancy by the Supreme Court in Geduldig v.
Aiello,' , General Electric Co. v. Gilbertm and Nashville Gas Co. v. Sat-
ty is a shameful episode in the legal history of sexual justice. Those
I Class lecture by Roberto M. Unger, Jurisprudence, Harvard Law School (Feb. 23,
1978).
, Ball, Judicial Protection of Powerless Minorities, 59 IowA L. REV. 1059, 1078 (1974).
Id. at 1086. This quote refers specifically to protection of the poor, but the same posi-
tion is applicable to the plight of pregnant women, especially insofar as their rights are
denied on economic grounds.
20' The Census Bureau has reported, for example, that during the last decade the number
of single parent families rose by 80%, now comprising 19% of all American families with
children. Seventeen percent of this number are maintained by women, and only 2% by men.
Among the single-parent families, 38% (as opposed to 29% in 1970) are maintained by
divorced women, 15% (as opposed to 7% in 1970) are maintained by never-married women,
and 12% (as opposed to 20% in 1970) by widows. In 1979, one-half of black families with
children at home were maintained by one parent. Meanwhile, the number of households
consisting of a married couple with children declined by about one million. Albuquerque
Journal, Aug. 17, 1980, at G-1, col. 1.
3" The Census figures, see note 351 supra, demonstrate that even the coercion of law
cannot perpetuate what once was.
417 U.S. 484 (1974). See generally notes 11-28 & accompanying text supra.
429 U.S. 125 (1976). See generally notes 40-49 & accompanying text supra.
434 U.S. 136 (1977). See generally notes 50-67 & accompanying text supra.
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decisions serve the purpose, however, of demonstrating what a difficult
and decisive issue pregnancy is. The congressional response to that
judicial treatment is a major improvement, yet Congress, too, has failed
to grasp the substantive dilemma: genuine sexual justice cannot be
achieved unless decisionmakers comprehend that the degraded status of
women is and always has been a function of the reproductive division of
labor. Instead of reinforcing the traditional arrangements which are
premised on that historical circumstance, the law must seek to undo the
harm occasioned by that most invidious of classifications.
The law can participate in the future rather than dwell in the past by
ceasing its attempted regulation of morality and by taking a hand now
in the establishment of new institutions which will accommodate the
real needs of real citizens. It has been pointed out that "[t]he withdrawal
of law from certain areas of moral choice does not inevitably portend a
collapse of the social order."5' Governments do have legitimate in-
terests in childbirth, but those interests do not justify coercive arrange-
ments designed to perpetuate an antiquated and inherently unjust
social order. Rather, governments should be concerned with facilitating
the experiences of motherhood and fatherhood, and with providing a
healthy environment for children. Let those interests be expressed by
financing childbirth sabbaticals, by enforcing paid maternity and pater-
nity leaves and by reconstructing the patriarchal institutions which
bifurcate and undermine the experience of women. If only unattractive
and destructive choices are imposed upon women, let the Supreme
Court declare the right of women to be treated, for the first time in our
history, with the respect afforded to other citizens.
Wilkinson & White, supra note 255, at 624.
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